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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers was
founded on October 14, 1946, in Manhattan, New York.1 At that
time, the organization consisted of nineteen members.2 Seventy-one
years later, that organization—now named the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)—boasts more than 15,000
members.3
Why do immigrants, their families, and their employers need so
many lawyers? This article will help answer this question by tracing
how our immigration law structure and policies have evolved to their
current state of affairs within our “nation of immigrants.”4 For
example, although the total number of legal immigrants entering
the United States during the 1950s was already more than 2.5
million, that number rose to 3.3 million in the 1960s.5 The number

1. American Immigration Lawyers Association, LAWYER LEGION, http://www.lawye
rlegion.com/associations/american-immigration-lawyers-association/ [https://per
ma.cc/5AA8-93QE].
2. See Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a Site of Professionalism: The Immigration
Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194, 201 (2011).
3. About, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N, http://www.aila.org/about [https://per
ma.cc/63M4-7ZNS].
4. President Kennedy is generally regarded as having first used this phrase as
the title of his book on American immigration, written while he was then a U.S.
Senator. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1959).
5. Peter H. Schuck, The Legal Rights of Citizens and Aliens in the United States, in
TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE CITIZENS?, JAPANESE & U.S. MIGRATION POLICIES 238,
244 (Myron Weiner & Tadashi Hanami eds., 1998).
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of immigrants entering the United Sates continued to increase until
the 1980s, when the annual number of lawful immigrants dropped
to around 500,000 per year.6 This article will address, among other
things, a brief history of immigration law throughout the decades,7
historical events and their impact on immigration policy,8 how the
policies of President Trump have differed from those of President
Obama,9 and thoughts on the future of immigration law and policy
in America.10
II. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW
A.

Early Immigration to the United States

To refer to the earliest American view of immigration as “policy”
is imprecise. The new country needed all the settlers it could muster.
Early American and pre-American colonists were primarily of
European origin, coming from Great Britain, France, the
Netherlands, and Spain.11 With them came involuntary immigrants
who were the earliest non-Europeans: African male and female
slaves.12 By the first census in 1790, the total population of the
United States was 3,227,000.13 Seventy-five percent of this total
consisted of persons of English, Scottish, and Scottish-Irish
heritage.14 Eight percent were German.15 Other nationalities that
represented a significant number were Dutch, French, Swedish, and
Spanish.16

6. Infra note 10.
7. See infra Parts II, III.
8. See infra Part V.
9. Compare infra Part VII, with infra Part VI.
10. See infra Part VIII.
11. An excellent, objective, and detailed history of United States immigration
law policy is provided in JOYCE VIALET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 91-141 EPW, BRIEF
HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY (1991) [hereinafter BRIEF HISTORY], reprinted
in STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT 578–91 (Comm. Print 1995), https://ia800301.us.archive.org/
22/items/bub_gb_oWLynZnattAC/bub_gb_oWLynZnattAC.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8HGF-35NP].
12. See id. at 580–81.
13. Id. at 581.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Surprisingly, immigration-stoked nativist tensions began early in
the United States.17 In 1753, Benjamin Franklin reflected on these
tensions in the following observations relating to the arrival of
Germans in Pennsylvania:
Those who come hither are generally of the most ignorant
Stupid Sort of their own Nation . . . and as few of the
English understand the German Language, and so cannot
address them either from the Press or Pulpit, ‘tis almost
impossible to remove any prejudices they once
entertain. . . . Not being used to Liberty, they know not how
to make a modest use of it. 18
Throughout the nineteenth century, population overcrowding in
Europe created a fortuitous match between the needs of the United
States and its immigrant arrivals.19 The 1864 Republican national
platform reflected this relationship:
[F]oreign immigration, which in the past has added so
much to the wealth, development of resources and increase
of power to the nation, the asylum of the oppressed of all
nations, should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal
and just policy.20
By the mid-1800s, immigration had increased by nearly 600
percent to more than four million—mostly from Western Europe.21
The need for labor following the Civil War, along with the
construction of intercontinental railway lines that facilitated
dispersion of migrants west from the east coast, fueled much of this
immigration.22 The people of the United States heard antiimmigrant concerns and nativist ideas from groups such as the Know
17. See generally Julia G. Young, Making America 1920 Again? Nativism and U.S.
Immigration, Past and Present, 5 J. MIGRATION HUM. SECURITY 217 (2017) (detailing the
history of nativism with particularity since the mid-nineteenth century).
18. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson (May 9, 1753),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0173 [https://perm
a.cc/M22C-JUGJ].
19. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 581 (“America . . . had a boundless need
for people to push back the frontier, to build the railways, to defend unstable
boundaries, and to populate new States. The belief in America as a land of asylum
for the oppressed was reinforced by the commitment to the philosophy of manifest
destiny.”).
20. D.F. MURPHY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION 58
(1864), https://ia800502.us.archive.org/13/items/presidentialelec00inrepu/presi
dentialelec00inrepu.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP3Z-MSGE].
21. See BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 582.
22. Id. at 583.
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Nothing party, whose anti-Catholicism supporters feared labor
competition, crime, poverty, and the political impacts of
immigration.23 Nevertheless, immigration continued to increase
during the latter half of the nineteenth century to more than five
million immigrants in 1880, almost all of whom came from Great
Britain, Germany, and Ireland.24
The earliest immigration-control legislation focused on
excluding immigrants who possessed unwanted moral
characteristics. For example, the first immigration laws barred
convicts and prostitutes.25 On August 3, 1882, the Immigration Act
of 1882 became the country’s first general immigration law.26 Then
came the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which represented the first
U.S. immigration law barring immigrant eligibility based solely on
national origin.27 The Chinese Exclusion Act created a ten-year
moratorium on Chinese labor immigration.28 The Act required the
few non-laborers who sought entry to the United States to obtain
certification from the Chinese government that they were qualified
to immigrate.29 Because the Act defined “Chinese laborers” as
“skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining,”
23. See Carl M. Cannon, Immigration and the Rise & Fall of the Know-Nothing Party,
REALCLEARPOLITICS (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/20
15/02/18/immigration_and_the_rise__fall_of_the_know-nothing_party_125649.h
tml [https://perma.cc/74ZC-6M3P]. See generally E.B. BARTLETT ET AL., PLATFORM OF
THE AMERICAN PARTY, ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION, JUNE 15, 1855 (1855),
https://www.sethkaller.com/slideshow.php?id=712&t=t-712-001-Ks22547_w.jpg [ht
tps://perma.cc/92Y4-7TZE]. Members of the group were instructed to respond “I
know nothing” when questioned about their participation and ideals (showing the
party was averse to grants of land or rights being extended to those “foreigners not
naturalized”). Id.
24. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 583.
25. Page Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (1875),
http://legisworks.org/congress/43/session-2/chap-141.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LS2-UAEM].
26. Immigration Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882),
http://legisworks.org/sal/22/stats/STATUTE-22-Pg214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WLC-MKVZ].
27. See Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882),
http://legisworks.org/congress/47/session-1/chap-126.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AP9M-59M6].
28. Id. § 1, 22 Stat. at 59 (“[T]en years next after the passage of this act, the
coming of Chinese laborers to the United States [shall] be . . . suspended.”).
29. Id. § 6, 22 Stat. at 60 (requiring that permitted Chinese immigrants be
issued a certificate—written in English—detailing all their physical, occupational,
and prior residential information).
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very few Chinese could enter the country under the law.30 The
Supreme Court, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, upheld the Chinese
Exclusion Act’s constitutionality over Justice Field’s vigorous
dissent.31 The Chinese Exclusion Act was not repealed until 1943.32
B.

The United States Implements Its First Numerical Quotas

Until the 1920s, legal restrictions on immigration were focused
more on qualitative characteristics than on numbers of immigrants
admitted to the United States.33 This changed between 1921 and
1929 when Congress adopted the Immigration Act of 1924, which
implemented a national origins quota.34 This quota effectively
prevented individuals from immigrating if they were born in the
“barred zone”—a region that consisted almost entirely of Asian
countries.35
Racial superiority was a dominant influence on the passage of
the national origins quota. Testimony from Dr. Harry H. Laughlin,
a eugenics consultant to the House Judiciary Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization in the 1920s, presented his theory
of the ethnic superiority of Caucasians:
We in this country have been so imbued with the idea of
democracy, or the equality of all men, that we have left out
of consideration the matter of blood or natural born
hereditary mental and moral differences . . . The National
30. Id. § 15, 22 Stat. at 61.
31. 149 U.S. 698, 744–61 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
32. See Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, 8 U.S.C. §§ 262–97, 299 (2012);
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/chinese-exclusion-actSTATE,
repeal [https://perma.cc/YWE6-FFK4]. The Magnuson Act, also known as
the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, was sold by the Roosevelt
administration as being important to the war effort. See President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Bill to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Laws
(Dec. 17, 1943), reprinted in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1943 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 548 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4926600.1943.001/582?rgn=full+text;vie
w=image;q1=December+17%2C+1943 [https://perma.cc/A5PA-2K4B]. However,
this compromise law still contained an ethnically based quota for Chinese
immigration. See id.
33. See
Chinese
Exclusion
Act
(1882),
WWW.OURDOCUMENTS.GOV,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=47 [https://perma.cc/
X644-4JMH].
34. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
35. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 585.
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Origins provisions of the immigration control law of 1924
marked the actual turning point from immigration control
based on the asylum idea . . . definitely in favor of the
biological basis.36
This eugenics argument continued to influence the immigration
debate during the decade but was soon replaced by practical
considerations.37
C.

Factors Influencing U.S. Immigration in the 1930s and 1940s

Immigration to the United States, particularly since 1930, has
directly reflected the economy’s need for immigrants as a labor
supply.38 As the economy became stronger, immigration increased;
when the economy weakened, immigration declined.39 This
phenomenon was strikingly apparent during the Great Depression,
when immigration virtually stopped because of economic hardships
and restrictive immigration laws.40 The economy’s effect became
further apparent in the steady rise in immigration during the United
States’ period of sustained economic growth after World War II.41
Additionally, the Displaced Persons Act of 194842—the first refugee
legislation in the nation’s history—influenced immigration to a
significant degree.43
Following the Russian Revolution and the resulting spread of
Communism throughout the world, the United States sought to limit
its influence.44 U.S. immigration policy in the 1930s and 1940s,

36. Id. at 585–86 (footnote omitted).
37. See infra Part II.C. But see infra Part II.A (wherein Congress returned to a
national origins argument to support immigration legislation).
38. See generally OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2015 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 (2016) [hereinafter OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Sta
tistics_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y7N-4PUE] (reflecting that during the
majority of the Great Depression and World War II eras (1931–44), legal
immigration decreased by nearly ninety percent from pre-Great Depression times
and would not rebound until after the conclusion of World War II).
39. See id. See generally BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 586 (noting the
balancing act that Americans of the period faced between economic protectionism
and humanitarian idealism when it came to immigration).
40. Cf. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 38.
41. See id.
42. Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
43. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 586.
44. See Red Scare, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/red-
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however, was not all about eliminating Communism within its
borders—immigration policy took a pragmatic turn in the form of
the Bracero Program.45 Originally embodied in a 1942 executive
order implementing a bilateral agreement between the United
States and Mexico, Congress formally adopted the Bracero Program
in 195146—nearly a decade after the Program’s initiation. 47 The
Program authorized the entry of hundreds of thousands of Mexican
agricultural workers into the United States to supplement what was
thought to be a post-World War II worker shortage.48
III. MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW
A.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) to finally resolve the patchwork of federal immigration laws
that Congress had enacted since 1790.49 The INA has been
tremendously significant to U.S. immigration law and has served as
the structural framework of the nation’s immigration laws, even after
being amended several times.50
The INA originally contained a controversial national origins
quota, which was based on the 1920 U.S. census and imposed a
150,000-person limit on immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere.51
Congress’ rationale for this limitation was somewhat defensive:
Without giving credence to any theory of Nordic
superiority, the subcommittee believes that the adoption of
the national origins formula was a rational and logical
method of numerically restricting immigration in such a
scare [https://perma.cc/26VB-7V4Y].
45. See About, BRACERO HISTORY ARCHIVE, http://braceroarchive.org/about
[https://perma.cc/G3TN-NZMW].
46. Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1951).
47. BRACERO HISTORY ARCHIVE, supra note 45.
48. Philip Martin, Does the U.S. Need a New Bracero
Program?, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 127, 127–29 (2003) (providing that more
than four million “braceros,” Mexican farm laborers, entered the country to meet
demands of the World War II labor shortage under this program).
49. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
50. See generally Public Laws Amending the INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/PUBLAW/HTML/PUBLAW/0-0-01.html [https://perma.cc/5X4D-YK5U].
51. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
IN A NUTSHELL 15 (6th ed. 2011).
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manner as to best preserve the sociological and cultural
balance of the United States.52
Critics of the INA said that the Act’s provisions were more restrictive
than the country needed, particularly with respect to the national
origins limitations.53 President Truman bluntly expressed this
opinion in his veto message:
Today, we are “protecting” ourselves as we were in 1924,
against being flooded by immigrants from Eastern
Europe . . . . The countries of Eastern Europe have fallen
under the Communist yoke—they are silenced, fenced off
by barbed wire and minefields—no one passes their
borders but at the risk of his life. We do not need to be
protected against immigrants from these countries—on
the contrary we want to stretch out a helping hand, to save
those who have managed to flee into Western Europe . . . .
These are only a few examples of the absurdity, the cruelty
of carrying over into this year of 1952 the isolationist
limitations of our 1924 law . . . . In no other realm of our
national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead
hand of the past, as we are in this field of immigration.54
Congress overrode President Truman’s veto by a vote of 278 to
113 in the House and 57 to 26 in the Senate.55 Despite President
Truman’s objections, the INA’s structure of inadmissible categories
of individuals,56 classifications of nonimmigrants,57 numerical
immigrant quotas,58 defined “preferences” of immigrants,59
immigrant admission procedures,60 procedure for obtaining
permanent resident status,61 and immigrant removal procedures62
has remained largely intact.
52. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 455 (1950), http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/
news/2008,0701-senatereport81-1515part3of5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XM8YPXVJ].
53. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 51, at 16.
54. HARRY S. TRUMAN, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, H.R. DOC. NO. 82520 (1952).
55. See id.
56. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012)
[hereinafter INA].
57. INA §§ 101(a)(15), 214, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), § 1184.
58. INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152.
59. INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153.
60. INA § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184.
61. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
62. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
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The physical structure of the INA has remained remarkably
durable—so much so that it is still common for those who regularly
deal with immigration law to refer to nonimmigrant visa statuses as
“E-1s,” “H-1Bs,” “H-2As,” “L-1s, “ and “O-1s.”63 These references
reflect the statutory subsections of the INA section 101(a)(15) in
which these statuses, the inadmissibility grounds,64 and even some
forms of relief are located.65 For all of President Truman’s criticism
of the philosophy and content of the INA, the Act has proven to be,
structurally, quite resilient. As shown in the following sections, the
INA has only occasionally undergone major amendments.
B.

U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
1.

Anti-Communism and Immigration Policy During the 1950s

One can trace the evolving values of the United States by
reading the grounds for immigrant inadmissibility in section 212 of
the INA.66 U.S. immigration laws have reflected the rejection of a
wide variety of behaviors, such as criminal behavior,67 terrorist
activities,68 Nazi participation,69 participation in genocide,70 illegal
entries or misrepresentations to secure immigration,71 returning
after deportation,72 and polygamy.73 Immigration law in the 1950s
aligned with a heightened opposition to Communism, reflected by
the U.S. policy decision to become a refuge for those fleeing
Communism.74 The INA embodied this refugee policy in several
amendments that authorized refugee admissions outside the
national origins quota system. For example, the Refugee Relief Act
of 1953,75 the 1954 amendments,76 the Refugee-Escapee Act of
63. See INA §§ 101(a)(15)(E), (H), (L), (O), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(E), (H),
(L), (O).
64. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
65. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
66. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
67. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
68. INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
69. INA § 212(a)(3)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i).
70. INA § 212(a)(3)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(ii).
71. INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
72. INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).
73. INA § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A).
74. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 588.
75. Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953).
76. Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (1954).
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1957,77 and the Fair Share Law of 196078 focused on welcoming and
protecting those immigrants fleeing from Communist countries, the
Middle East, and Cuba.79
2.

The Abolition of the National Origins Quota and Immigration
Policy in the 1960s and 1970s

Following the congressional override of his veto in 1952,
President Truman appointed “The President’s Commission on
Immigration and Naturalization.”80 This commission issued a 319page report urging the abolition of the national origins quota and
recommending a quota formula that was not based on “national
origin, race, creed or color.”81 Ultimately, President Kennedy
embraced the commission’s report and worked on securing
amendments to the INA.82 After President Kennedy’s assassination,
President Johnson picked up the national origins quota issue.83
During President Johnson’s administration, Congress passed the
1965 INA amendments.84 These amendments replaced the national
origins quota formula with a system based primarily on familial and
skills preferences.85
The 1965 amendments fundamentally changed the INA and
formed the basis for the current quota system.86 The amendments
77. Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957).
78. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 505 (1960).
79. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 11, at 588.
80. See President Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Issuing
Order Establishing a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (Sept. 4,
1952), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14244 [https://perm
a.cc/5YCS-XAJB].
81. See President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress
Transmitting Report of the President’s Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization (Jan. 13, 1953), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=14387 [https://perma.cc/BR7Y-CFC5]; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 263 (1953).
82. See Garnet K. Emery, The American Dream—For the Lucky Ones: The United
States’ Confused Immigration Policy, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 755, 762 (1989) (“The
1965 Amendments . . . found a strong advocate in President John F. Kennedy.”).
83. Muzaffar Chishti et al., Fifty Years On, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act Continues to Reshape the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fifty-years-1965-immigration-and-nationa
lity-act-continues-reshape-united-states [https://perma.cc/VV3W-UL5B].
84. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
85. See id.
86. See Chishti, supra note 83.
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“marked a radical break with previous policy and . . . led to profound
demographic changes in America.”87 The amendments created an
annual cap on “visas for immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere,
with no single country allowed more than 20,000 visas,” and
established a somewhat lower cap for immigrants from the
Western Hemisphere.88 Additionally, the amendments reserved
“[t]hree-fourths of admissions . . . for those arriving in family
categories.”89 Spouses, minor children, and parents of adult U.S.
citizens “were exempt from the caps; [twenty-four] percent of family
visas were assigned to siblings of U.S. citizens.”90
In 1976, Congress adjusted the preference system to redefine
who was eligible to immigrate and ultimately applied a 20,000 per
country limit to the Western Hemisphere.91 “[I]n 1978, a worldwide
immigrant visa quota was set at 290,000.”92
C.

Developments in Immigration Law During the 1970s93

Relative to the complexities of today’s immigration system and
enforcement agencies, the legal immigration landscape of the 1970s
was relatively straightforward and accessible. Routinely, officials
typed and mailed documents; applicants received their decisions by
mail or in person. The implementing agencies—the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), the State Workforce Agencies, and
the Department of Labor and State Department—were also
relatively accessible. Because the process was simpler and shorter
than in modern day, the outcomes of nonimmigrant and immigrant
visa status applications were predictable. Applicants usually received
their decisions within days or weeks.
During this period, attorneys and their clients could appear at
an INS office, a U.S. embassy, or even a U.S. consulate to have a

87. Jennifer Ludden, 1965 Immigration Law Changed Face of America, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (May 9, 2006, 3:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?st
oryId=5391395 [https://perma.cc/6FVJ-DEX2].
88. Chishti, supra note 83.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The author worked as an immigration lawyer during this period and
supplies a firsthand account. A charmingly accurate description of the way
immigration used to be practiced can be found in CALVIN TRILLIN, Making
Adjustments, in TRILLIN ON TEXAS 113, 113–34 (2011).
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nonimmigrant petition decided or a visa issued while they waited.
Many INS offices had an upfront adjudication policy, which allowed
individuals seeking a status adjustment to “permanent resident” to
appear at an INS office, file their paperwork along with the modest
filing fee, and receive employment authorization that same day. The
INS would then schedule applicants for their interviews, at which
time INS would regularly approve the applications.
Little more than a quick visit to the Social Security Office was
needed for a foreign visitor to secure a U.S. social security number.
No effective mechanism existed for counting the number of
individuals entering or departing the United States. The only
measurement available was through use of a simple little card,
known as an I-94. The INS issued an I-94 card to most immigrants,
who were then supposed to return the card to immigration
authorities upon departure. Often, immigrants did not return their
cards. Even if an immigrant returned their 1-94 card upon leaving
the United States, the INS would simply send the card to a storage
facility where it was virtually impossible to retrieve.
At this time, employers regularly hired undocumented
immigrants without acquiring knowledge of their prospective
employees’ immigration statuses; employers had no obligation to
question it. Furthermore, an exception to employer liability—often
referred to as the “Texas Proviso”—protected businesses from
violating federal law even if the hiring of these individuals
constituted “harboring” an undocumented person.94 These
conditions made the U.S. labor market freely open to immigrants
with few adverse consequences to either party.
With relatively low border patrol and interior enforcement
presence, limited documentation of entries and departures,
availability of Social Security numbers for anyone who wanted one,
walk-in service for most immigrant benefits, and no consequences
for employers hiring undocumented workers, the result was
inevitable: many undocumented immigrants were living in the
United States. The most reliable estimates from that time suggested
that about three million undocumented immigrants were living in
the United States by 1980.95 In the words of one observer, “[i]nstead
94. The Bracero Program, 9 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, no. 2, Apr. 2003,
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=10 [https://perma.cc/5X895W5Z].
95. See Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2016,
PROCON.ORG, https://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?

756

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

of the [expected] 450,000 immigrants anticipated in 1980, 808,000
legal immigrants, refugees, and special entrants were admitted, and
an unknown number of illegal or undocumented workers, as many
as 500,000, entered by various means.”96 It comes as no surprise that,
by 1980, many believed that immigration to the United States was
out of control.
D.

Employer Responsibility for Verifying Employee Immigration
Authorization Status and Marriage Fraud Reduction

Given the state of immigration during the latter half of the
twentieth century, Congress created the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978.97 Congress gave the
Commission two years to develop a remedy for what was widely
perceived as an outdated immigration system.98 The Commission’s
report from March 1981 contained sixty-seven recommendations
designed to reassert the government’s ability to regulate
immigration.99 Among the Commission’s recommendations were
objectives of establishing tougher enforcement practices, higher
immigration quotas, amnesty for most illegal aliens already in the
United States, and a “more reliable” means of checking the
immigration status of all workers.100 Congress essentially adopted
these recommendations through the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).101
Signed by President Reagan in 1986, IRCA focused not only on
dealing with the undocumented population, but also on
discouraging the employment of undocumented immigrants.102
IRCA assumed a forgiving attitude toward some undocumented
immigrants who lived in the United States unlawfully for many

resourceID=000844 [https://perma.cc/7NJ9-EMHP].
96. Philip L. Martin, Select Commission Suggests Changes in Immigration Policy—A
Review Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 31, 31 (Feb. 1982), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr
/1982/02/art4full.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8FV-JPF3].
97. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat.
907, 907–09 (1978).
98. Id.
99. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1206, at 124 (1978).
100. Id.
101. See Pub L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (creating section 274A of the
INA).
102. See id.
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years.103 However, IRCA also shifted a significant level of
responsibility to immigrants and their employers to acquire and
maintain mechanisms of authorizing lawful employment status.104
IRCA represented a political compromise: exchanging a
“legalization” program affecting millions of undocumented
persons105 for a requirement that employers must verify authorized
status of all employees on pain of civil, or even criminal, sanctions.106
Conversely, IRCA prohibited employers from engaging in
discriminatory practices against permanent immigrants who were
legally present in the United States.107
Essentially, IRCA turned employment in the United States into
a regulated commodity by fundamentally changing the relationships
between U.S. employers, foreign-born workers, and the immigration
agencies. Titled the Simpson-Mazzoli Act—with reference to former
Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-WY) and former Congressman Romano
L. Mazzoli (D-KY)—IRCA permanently raised the level of employer
responsibility concerning immigration authorization in all
employer-employee relationships.108 Although several years passed
before IRCA’s employment verification and employer sanction
provisions gained full political traction, the ubiquitous “Form I-9”
became an element of virtually every employment relationship
consummated after November 6, 1986.109
The impacts on these relationships are shown by the monetary
consequences to employers for straying from the regulations;
103. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012)
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. §§ 101, 201.
107. INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.
108. See id. See generally Brad Plumer, Congress Tried to Fix Immigration Back in
1986. Why Did It Fail?, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/30/in-1986-congress-tried-to-solve-immigratio
n-why-didnt-it-work/?utm_term=.628c356b1a94 [https://perma.cc/CD4Q-WFZJ]
(describing how employers used sub-contractor agreements and mere precursory
investigations to avoid the employer verification requirements imposed under the
IRCA).
109. Catherine P. Wells, The Modification and Expansion of the Employment
Eligibility Verification Process, in THE IMPACT OF REVISIONS TO THE I-9 FORM AND E-VERIFY
PROCESS 2009 WL 1428147, at *1 (“Pursuant to IRCA, following November 1986, all
employers were required [sic] verify the employment authorization of all newly
hired employees by completing a Form 1-9 [sic] and reviewing documentation
confirming each employee’s [sic] identity and authorization to work in the United
States.”).
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however, since IRCA’s passage, employer sanction fines have varied
considerably. For instance, in 1999, the total amount of
administrative fines levied was almost $1.7 million.110 That figure
dropped to zero in 2006;111 thereafter, this figure began its steady
increase, reaching over $16 million in 2014.112 Criminal fines and
forfeitures during the same period experienced a similar pattern,
exceeding $35 million in 2014.113
The broad amnesty IRCA provided to undocumented
immigrants was inextricably linked to IRCA’s employer sanctions
and verification requirements. IRCA’s amnesty applied to millions of
unauthorized immigrants who lived in the United States since
January 1, 1982, and were continuously present in the United States
until November 6, 1986.114 According to the Migration Policy
Institute, this program accounted for approximately 1.6 million
individuals receiving permanent residence.115
Additionally, IRCA carved out provisions of law that penalized
employers for engaging in unfair immigration-related employment
practices.116 This portion of IRCA sought to deter U.S. employers
from avoiding immigrant employment altogether. These provisions
prohibited employers with four or more employees from practicing
citizenship or immigration-status discrimination “with respect to
hiring, firing, and recruitment or referral for a fee.”117 The
legislation also prohibited employers with small numbers of
employees from practicing “national origin” discrimination.118
110. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 5 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesec/R40002.pdf [https://perma.cc/U58X-DZTT].
111. Id.
112. See BRUNO, supra note 110, at 5.
113. Id.
114. IRCA, Pub L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394–95 (1986) (allowing
some brief, casual, and innocent departures to be forgiven for amnesty
qualification).
115. Donald M. Kerwin, More than IRCA: US Legalization Programs and the Current
Policy Debate, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. POL’Y BRIEF, Dec. 2010, at 2, https://www.migra
tionpolicy.org/pubs/legalization-historical.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA4T-VWBA]
(showing “general legalization” under IRCA at 1,596,912).
116. § 102, 100 Stat. at 3374–80; see Overview of the Immigrant and Employee Rights
Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/overview-immigrant-andemployee-rights-section [https://perma.cc/6X4K-8MD2].
117. § 102, 100 stat. at 3374–80.
118. Id. (including employers with more than three but fewer than fifteen
employees).
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Under these provisions, employers could not request additional
documents other than those required to verify employment
eligibility, reject reasonably genuine-looking documents, or specify
a preference for certain documents over others with the purpose or
intent of discriminating on the basis of citizenship status or national
origin.119 Finally, IRCA’s provisions prohibited retaliation against or
coercion of employees who filed unfair employment practices
complaints.120
The primary classes of individuals protected by IRCA were U.S.
citizens, permanent residents, temporary resident asylees, and
refugees. These laws were (and are) enforced by the Office of Special
Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices,
later renamed the Immigration and Employee Rights Section.121
In addition to IRCA, the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986 (IMFA)122 increased personal responsibility on
parties by adding consequences for abuse of marriage-based grounds
for permanent residence.123 Before IMFA, parties who married solely
for immigration purposes faced some consequences, but identifying
fraudulent marriages was far more difficult for immigration
agencies.124 After IMFA, parties who were married less than two
years before acquiring permanent residence status received a
conditional-status grant.125 IMFA required review of the grant prior
to the second anniversary of the conditional residence status.126
Additionally, IMFA required a higher burden of proof of legitimacy
before a couple could receive approval of a marriage that occurred

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Types of Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/
types-discrimination [https://perma.cc/5VRS-PFLC].
122. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
123. See id.
124. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/00-0-1/0-0-0-11685/0-0-0-11691.html [https://perma.cc/7D9F-H4BB]. While the
consequences remained largely unchanged after IMFA, the act’s passage largely
addressed the question of fraud through use of a “conditional residence” process.
Id. This counteracted the opportunity for aliens to obtain a permanent residency
through quickie marriages or “‘marriage for hire’ schemes.” Id.
125. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/immigration-marriagefraud-amendments-1986 [https://perma.cc/RMJ5-45X8].
126. Id.

760

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

during removal proceedings.127 After IMFA, the consequences of
entering a fraudulent marriage were much more severe.128
E.

The Immigration Act of 1990

In a speech to AILA in the mid-1990s, former Congressman
Peter Rodino was asked why Congress had found it necessary to
divide immigration reform into two parts—the first dealing primarily
with undocumented immigrants. His answer was simple: Congress
certainly would have preferred to handle the entire immigration
reform issue at one time; however, it was not politically feasible to
address any issues of legal immigration until Congress addressed the
issue of illegal immigration separately.129
The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90)130 contained the
most comprehensive provisions concerning legal immigration since
the 1965 amendments. Some believe it to be the most significant
legal immigration legislation since 1924.131 Senator Simpson, one of
the bill’s chief sponsors, said that the Act culminated the
decade-long effort to “close the back door” of illegal immigration
“while [opening] the front door wider to allow skilled immigrants of
a more diverse range of nationalities.”132 IMMACT 90 is far too
comprehensive to fully summarize in this article, but some aspects
are notable. Specifically, IMMACT 90 established a flexible
worldwide cap on family-based, employment-based, and diversity
immigrant visas.133 IMMACT 90 also provided that visas for any single
foreign state in these categories could not exceed seven percent of
the total number of available visas.134
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Peter Rodino, U.S. Congressman, Remarks of Congressman Peter Rodino
to AILA 1996 Annual Conference; cf. Juan P. Osuna, Amnesty in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 Policy Rationale and Lessons from Canada, 3 AM. U.J. INT’L
L.
& POL’Y 145, 159–61 (1988) (reviewing the political history of IRCA).
130. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991); Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
131. Cf. Congress Approves Major Immigration Reform, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1209 (Oct. 29, 1990).
132. 136 CONG. REC. S17,109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Simpson).
133. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 201, 104 Stat. 4978, 4980–82
(1990).
134. Id. § 131, at 4999.
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IMMACT 90 and its related technical amendments substantially
increased the overall immigrant quotas to 700,000, which would
decrease to 675,000 after three years; increased the immigrant quota
allocations to family members; and increased and expanded
employment-based immigrant quotas, as well as most of the
nonimmigrant employment-based quotas.135 IMMACT 90 further
established the Employment Creation Immigrant Visa, EB-5.136
The provisions of IMMACT 90 redefined several family-based
immigrant quotas and nearly tripled the number of
employment-based immigration preferences—from 54,000 to
140,000 annually—creating significant new immigrant classifications
called “preferences.”137 This new law also created a separate category
of 50,000 “diversity” immigrant visas for nationals of
“underrepresented countries.”138 IMMACT 90 made significant
changes to the H, L, J, and E nonimmigrant visa classifications, and
added a few important nonimmigrant visa statuses—such as the
O (extraordinary ability), P (athletes and entertainers),
Q (international cultural exchange), and R (religious workers).139
IMMACT 90 also added a Temporary Protected Status authorization,
which allowed certain individuals from countries beset with conflicts,
natural disasters, or other unsafe conditions to remain in the United
States temporarily.140
Finally, IMMACT 90 made a significant change to the H-1B visa
status, adding an annual cap of 65,000 immigrants.141 The Act
required an employer to file a “labor condition attestation”
application, assuring that H-1B workers were being paid either the
prevailing wage for the position or the actual employer’s wage,
whichever was higher.142 The annual quota became a significant

135. Id.
136. Id. § 121, at 4989. EB-5 visas gives preference to immigrants who have
extraordinary abilities or hold advanced degrees, and those who are outstanding
professors and researchers, multinational executives and managers, or skilled
workers. Id.
137. Compare id. § 101, at 4982, with supra Parts III.A–B. (discussing the
“preference” criterion in two different eras).
138. § 131, 104 Stat. at 4998.
139. Id. §§ 205–209, at 5019–27.
140. Id. § 302, at 5030–36.
141. Id. § 205, at 5019–20.
142. Id. § 205, at 5021.
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problem in later years as the need for highly skilled workers
increased and exceeded the quota, resulting in an H-1B lottery.143
The Act’s favorable impacts were immediately felt on October
1, 1991.144 After years of backlogs, the State Department Visa Bulletin
showed virtually all immigrant categories as available.145 IMMACT
90’s impact and the emergence of the high-tech revolution
converged at the turn of the century, when many feared that
databases and computer systems would require significant
reprogramming.146 This led to a high volume of computer engineers
immigrating to the United States, particularly from India.147
On the enforcement side, IMMACT 90’s provisions reduced
legal processes available to individuals convicted of aggravated
felonies,148 expanded the definition of an aggravated felony,149
eliminated judicial recommendations against deportation,150 and
barred aggravated felons from admission to the United States for
twenty years.151 Finally, IMMACT 90 comprehensively revised the
grounds of immigrant exclusion and deportation.152

143.
144.

See id. § 205, at 5019; infra Part V.A.
MICHAEL J. GREENWOOD & FRED A. ZIEL, THE IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION
ACT OF 1990 ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/
cir/greenwood/combined.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZM28-3VWX]
(“Effective
October 1, 1991, U.S. immigration law changed considerably.”).
145. See Seth Mydans, For Winners in Visa Lottery, Round 2, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29,
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/29/us/for-winners-in-visa-lottery-round2.html [https://perma.cc/JM8A-3AVK] (stating that visa lotteries were “aimed
at giving a boost to immigrants from 34 nations that have been
underrepresented in recent years”); see also Visa Bulletin for October 1991, IMMIHELP,
https://www.immihelp.com/visa-bulletin/october-1991.html [https://perma.cc/
36BH-SE89].
146. See Panic for the Year 2000 (CBC television broadcast Jan. 4, 1999),
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/panic-for-the-year-2000 [https://perma.cc/J3S
SP-YR3V] (addressing fears over an approaching “large-scale breakdown” of
technology surrounding the new millennium).
147. See A Model Minority: How Indians Triumphed in America, THE ECONOMIST
(Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21710784america-needs-consider-what-it-might-lose-if-it-curbs-influx-clever [https://perma.c
c/XH4U-LDVA].
148. See The Immigration Act of 1990 Analyzed: Part 10 – Enforcement, 68
INTERPRETER RELEASES 197, 197–202 (Feb. 25, 1991).
149. § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048.
150. Id. § 505, at 5050.
151. Id. § 514, at 5053.
152. Id. § 601, at 5067–77.
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F.

Immigration Law into the 1990s and Beyond

Legal immigration to the United States continued to be
substantial after 1986, hitting one million in 1989 for the first time
in U.S. history.153 In fact, legal immigration to the United States
exceeded 900,000 people per year in two-thirds of the years between
1986 and 2015.154 In 2016, 13.5 percent of the U.S. population was
comprised of immigrants.155 Likewise, since 1986, the growth of
immigration legal practice has been exponential.156 The increased
complexity of immigration laws—coupled with a greater number of
immigrants coming to the United States—has required our society
and our profession to adapt to new immigrant classifications, and to
challenge agency interpretations of immigration laws, sometimes
relying on the efforts of pro bono legal counsel and nonprofit
organizations.157
In addition to this increased complexity and volume of
filings—and restructuring agencies to accommodate these
153. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 38.
154. Id. At the time of this writing, 2015 is the last year for which we have reliable
statistics.
155. See U.S. Immigrant Population and Share Over Time, 1850–Present, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immig
rant-population-over-time?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true [https://perma.c
c/G8NG-V26Q]. For this purpose, the term “immigrants” includes people residing
in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth, including naturalized
citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), certain legal nonimmigrants (e.g.,
persons on student or work visas), those admitted under refugee or asylee status,
and persons illegally residing in the United States. Id.
156. Note that while the need for immigration lawyers has steadily grown, the
number of attorneys practicing immigration law has not increased in proportion
with the numbers of immigrants requiring legal assistance. Suzanne Gamboa,
Demand Intensifies for Nonprofit Immigration Lawyers, NBC (Dec. 14, 2014),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-reform/demand-intensifies-no
onprofit-immigration-lawyers-n267206 [https://perma.cc/258F-Z7QN] (showing
the “intensified demand for immigration attorneys”).
157. See David Lash, The Critical Need for Pro Bono Immigration Work, ABOVE THE
LAW (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:59 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/12/the-critical-needfor-pro-bono-immigration-work/ [https://perma.cc/35AZ-SKJ2] (“Any pending
increase in immigration deportation proceedings will require an uptick in
vigilance.”); AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW PRACTICE
TASK FORCE, THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW PRACTICE 1-1 (2016),
http://www.aila.org/File/Related/The_Future_of_Immigration-Report.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/WM2T-YUQ2] (describing the need for attorneys to change their
methods of acting as “gatekeepers for immigrants” in dealing with the growing
numbers and evolving needs of immigrant clients).
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changes—governmental immigration agencies made a fundamental
management change that would have implications for decades to
come. Gradually, agencies regionalized adjudication functions so
that it was no longer possible to physically go into an office and
obtain a benefit. Immigration lawyers faced a system of “remote
adjudications,” in which lawyers had virtually no interaction with the
agents making the application and petition decisions.158 Beginning
in the early 1990s, this remote access to the decision-makers became
a permanent aspect of the immigration process.159
One might have thought that IRCA and IMMACT 90 would
resolve most U.S. immigration issues. This was not the case. The U.S.
Commission of Immigration Reform (the “Jordan Commission”),
created by IMMACT 90, was tasked with considering policies and
recommending changes in several areas of immigration
enforcement.160 The Jordan Commission made interim reports in
1994, 1995, and 1997.161 The Commission’s 1994 interim report,
entitled Restoring Credibility,162 recommended controlling illegal
immigration through more aggressive enforcement efforts.163 By the
time the Commission released Restoring Credibility, the number of
undocumented immigrants in the United States had reached
approximately 3.6 million.164 The Commission recommended

158. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. L. REV. 933,
942, 945 (2015) (stating that “[t]oday’s immigration bench sits in sixty different
geographic jurisdictions” with “several different hearing locations” and that
“[t]ypically, the prosecutor, interpreter, and any respondent’s counsel remain in
the courtroom with the judge rather than traveling to the detention facility to
appear on video with the immigrant”).
159. Id. at 945 (“In 1996, Congress authorized the use of televideo in all
immigration proceedings.”).
160. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 141, 104 Stat. 4978,
5001–02 (1990).
161. A thorough discussion of these reports is beyond the scope of this article
but may be found elsewhere. See Carlos Ortiz Miranda, United States Commission on
Immigration Reform: The Interim and Final Reports, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 645 (1998).
162. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY:
RESTORING CREDIBILITY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1994) [hereinafter RESTORING
CREDIBILITY].
163. See id. at 5, 15 (stating the Commission believes “that it is possible to reduce
unlawful immigration in a manner that is consistent with our traditions, civil rights,
and civil liberties,” but that “[u]nfortunately, no quick and easy solutions are
available”).
164. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S.,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/
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increasing border controls and hiring more border police to reduce
the flow of illegal immigrants from Mexico into Texas, Arizona, and
California.165 The Commission’s 1995 interim report, entitled Setting
Priorities, focused on legal immigration and emphasized two main
areas: family-based and skill-based immigration.166 Setting Priorities
urged the simplification of immigration categories and
recommended the United States admit no more than 550,000 legal
immigrants annually.167
The Commission’s 1997 interim report, entitled Taking
Leadership,168 addressed refugee status and the granting of asylum.169
Taking Leadership urged the allocation of international assistance for
refugees, even for those who could not legally resettle in the United
States.170 The Jordan Commission submitted the final report,
entitled Becoming an American, to Congress on September 30, 1997.171
By the release of the second interim report in 1995, Congress’
composition was quite different from what it was in both 1986 and
1990. Specifically, when IRCA was passed in 1986 during Republican
President Reagan’s second administration, Congress was divided:
Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, and
Republicans controlled the Senate.172 However, when IMMACT 90
was passed, Republican George H.W. Bush was President, and
Democrats controlled both houses of Congress.173

04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/J532-BSW
D] (tracking the growth and current state of illegal immigration in the United
States).
165. RESTORING CREDIBILITY, supra note 162, at 5–6.
166. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING
PRIORITIES (1995).
167. Id. at 39.
168. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. REFUGEE POLICY: TAKING
LEADERSHIP (1997).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 9.
171. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN:
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY (1997).
172. See Congress Profiles: 99th Congress, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/
99th/
[https://perma.cc/PU4U-PB3Y];
Party
Division,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/2PV9-49Z9].
173. See Congress Profiles: 101st Congress, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/
101st/ [https://perma.cc/7G32-WX9M]; U.S. SENATE, supra note 172.
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In the cultural arena, public commentary in the 1990s reflected
anxiety over the increase in immigration from non-European
countries. In 1995, for example, Peter Brimelow wrote a national
bestseller entitled Alien Nation, criticizing the United States for
falling away from its Caucasian roots through its immigration
policies.174 Similarly, white nationalist Samuel Francis opined that
“[t]he threat of white extinction is due to non-white immigration
and high fertility coupled with low white fertility.”175 Even former
U.S. presidential candidate Patrick J. Buchanan supported this
notion in his book, The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and
Immigrant Invasions Imperil our Country and Civilization.176
By the time Congress considered the next significant
immigration laws, the United States had a Democratic president in
Bill Clinton, and “[f]or the first time in forty years, both houses of
Congress were controlled by Republican[s].”177 Moreover,
Republicans were interested in reducing overall immigration.178 As

174. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER, at xviii (1995) (“In this book, I discuss the surprising
evidence that immigration is, and probably always has been, much less important to
American economic growth than is conventionally assumed.”). Beginning in the
1970s, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS), Numbers USA, The Pioneer Fund, and VDARE—a
nationalist website founded and edited by Brimelow—became public advocates for
reduced immigration. See Heidi Beirich, The Nativist Lobby: Three Faces of Intolerance,
S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Jan. 31, 2009), https://www.splcenter.org/20090131/nativistlobby-three-faces-intolerance [https://perma.cc/DQ2N-F3AX]. The influence of
these and other immigration organizations, who have argued for reduced
immigration, has expanded until today. See infra note 316.
175. Samuel Francis, Prospects for Racial and Cultural Survival, AM. RENAISSANCE
(Mar. 1995), https://www.amren.com/news/2011/06/prospects_for_r/ [https://
perma.cc/U5EF-HS5E].
176. See PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING POPULATIONS
AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILIZATION 113 (2002).
Buchanan was a special advisor to U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and
Ronald Reagan, and was an original host on CNN’s Crossfire. See Pat Buchanan,
BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people/pat-buchanan-9542078 [https://
perma.cc/U94W-XYTS]. He sought the Republican presidential nomination in
1992 and 1996. Id. He ran on the Reform Party ticket in the 2000 presidential
election. Id.
177. Russell L. Riley, Bill Clinton: Campaigns and Elections, UNIV. OF VA.,
https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/campaigns-and-elections [https://pe
rma.cc/N9WA-ZCW6].
178. In testimony before the Senate Immigration Subcommittee on March 14,
1995, Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-WY) outlined a “plan of attack” to deal with legal
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a result, when the 104th Congress convened on January 4, 1995,
Congress fully turned its attention to dramatically revising the legal
system to increase immigration law enforcement.179 In his opening
statement on September 13, 1995, Senator Simpson, Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, stated that a “false sense
of security ha[d] resulted in an unnecessary increase in legal
immigration.”180
Congress’ effort began with H.R. 1915, known as the
Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995. Congressman
Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee
of the House of Representatives, introduced the bill.181 In the
Senate, Senator Simpson introduced S. 269, known as the Immigrant
Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1995.182 Senator Simpson
also introduced S. 1394 (the Immigration Reform Act of 1995).183
Together, these bills would substantially reduce both family-based
and employment-based immigration.184
During the next year, extensive hearings and politics
surrounded the issue of immigration. In fact, at a markup hearing
on S. 269, Senator Simpson noted, “[w]e currently have an
atmosphere in which almost anyone who wants to become [the next]
President of the United States is using immigration as an avenue.”185
Moderating his approach somewhat, Senator Simpson warned
against being swept along the current and urged Congress to

immigration that would emphasize legal immigration focusing on skilled
immigrants, which would limit family sponsorship to members of the “nuclear
family.” See Senate Immigration Subcommittee Hears Testimony on Legislative Proposals, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 377, 378–79 (Mar. 20, 1995). A Senate staffer indicated that
a point system similar to those in effect in Australia and Canada might be
considered. Id.
179. New Republican Congress Convenes, With Immigration High on the Agenda, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 58, 58–63 (Jan. 9, 1995) (discussing the then-anticipated roles
of the political participants in this immigration law reform).
180. Senate Holds Hearing on Legal Immigration Reform, Ponders Draft Bill, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1257, 1257 (Sept. 18, 1995).
181. See New Republican Congress Convenes, With Immigration High on the Agenda,
supra note 179, at 59.
182. See S. 269, 104th Cong. (1995).
183. See S. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995).
184. Senate Holds Hearing on Legal Immigration Reform, Ponders Draft Bill, supra note
180, at 1258–61.
185. Senate Picks up the Pace, Heads Towards Markup of Simpson Bill, Administration
Sends Bill to Congress, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 653, 653 (May 15, 1995).
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consider “careful and thoughtful legislation . . . done in a way that is
not nativist.”186
In 1996, the political conflict over immigration reform
continued amid the bitter federal budget dispute between the
Republican
congressional
leadership
and the
Clinton
administration.187 The immigration legislative effort had adopted an
ominous tone. One commentator noted at the time, “[c]haritable
organizations understand that our nation’s current phase of hostility
toward the foreign-born may find legislative expression. Many
organizations already function in a hostile atmosphere. They are
now, however, casting a wary eye toward legislation more draconian
than they could have anticipated.”188
Eventually, on a motion by Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI),
S. 269 was split and eventually adopted in two parts: one addressing
illegal immigration and the other addressing legal immigration.189
The House of Representatives followed the same divisional
approach.190 This approach eliminated the immigration bills’
proposed reductions on future levels of family-based and
employment-based immigration.
In the summer of 1996, the immigration legislation stalled in
Congress. Disagreements in the Senate persisted over the newly
created procedure of “expedited exclusion,” deadlines for asylum
applications, admissibility bars for people who overstayed their
nonimmigrant status, and specific income requirements for
individuals filing affidavits of support for new immigrants.191 In the
House of Representatives, a proposal that would have allowed states
to deny public education to undocumented children was causing

186.
187.

Id.
Immigration, Other Priorities on Congressional Agenda for 1996, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 133, 133–36 (Jan. 29, 1996).
188. Donald M. Kerwin, Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor or Your Huddled
Masses: The Impact of Pending Legislation, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 157, 157 (Feb. 5,
1996).
189. Senate Committee Splits Immigration Reform Bill, House Floor Action is Next, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 313, 313 (Mar. 18, 1996); Senate Panel Continues Bill Markup,
Simpson to Drop Employment Changes, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 289, 289–90 (Mar. 11,
1996).
190. See House Approves Immigration Bill After Removing Legal Immigration
Restrictions, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 349, 349 (Mar. 25, 1996).
191. Controversy Continues to Stall Immigration Bill, Time Becoming a Factor, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 957, 957–58 (July 22, 1996).
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delay.192 However, the legislative process surrounding immigration
reform eventually picked up steam, and on September 30, 1996,
President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) into law.193
Between 1993 and 2001, the Clinton administration’s approach
reflected the Republican-controlled Congress’ emphasis on
immigration enforcement. Although President Clinton supported
legal immigration,194 when faced with strong Republican opposition,
he did little to advocate for an increase in immigration. The bills that
President Clinton signed were primarily aimed at enforcing laws
against illegal immigration and unauthorized employment of
undocumented workers.195
In his 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton
announced a legislative proposal that would add seven hundred new
Border Patrol agents; expand the employment verification pilot
program; and increase penalties for alien smuggling, illegal reentry,
failure to depart, employer violations, and immigrant document
fraud.196 The President proposed streamlined deportation
procedures to speed criminal aliens’ removal from the United
States.197 This enforcement approach was clearly evident in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,198 the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),199 the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996,200 and IIRIRA.201 These acts eliminated eligibility for many
192. Id. at 957.
193. Pub. L. No 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
194. BILL CLINTON, BETWEEN HOPE AND HISTORY 133–34 (1995) (“Immigrants
who enter our country legally and begin the process of attaining citizenship today
are little different from the strivers who were our own ancestors. We need to
remember that, and repudiate those who argue against immigration as a thinly
veiled pretext for discrimination.”).
195. Id. at 134 (“We must not tolerate illegal immigration.”).
196. See William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 24, 1995), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=51634 [https://perma.cc/JXL6-LM6S].
197. See id.
198. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
199. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
200. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
201. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
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federal benefits for noncitizens; increased border patrol resources;
created criminal offenses for deported persons who reentered the
United States; added new admissibility grounds, particularly for
individuals who overstayed their nonimmigrant statuses; limited
certain forms of federal judicial review; and significantly expanded
government incarceration of undocumented persons.202
By 2000, U.S. legal-immigration laws were showing signs of
insufficiency in meeting the nation’s long-term labor and family
unification needs. IIRIRA’s six titles dealt almost exclusively with
border control and interior enforcement.203 Title I addressed border
control, legal entry, and interior enforcement.204 Title II focused on
alien smuggling and document fraud.205 Title III covered inspection,
apprehension, detention, and removal.206 Title IV dealt with
employment restrictions.207 Title V addressed public benefit
restrictions,208 and Title VI covered asylum, consular procedures,
foreign students, and miscellaneous issues.209
While a comprehensive explanation of IIRIRA’s provisions is
beyond the scope of this article,210 several significant provisions have
had lasting impacts. For example, section 110 of IIRIRA required the
Attorney General to develop an “automated entry and exit control
system.”211 This automated system made accounting for the entry
and departure of aliens much easier for immigration agencies.
Further, section 123 authorized the establishment of pre-inspection

104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
202. See id.; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 435, 438; Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, §§ 130001–10.
203. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 1.
204. § 101, 110 Stat. at 3009-553.
205. § 201, 110 Stat. at 3009-564.
206. § 301, 110 Stat. at 3009-575.
207. § 401, 110 Stat. at 3009-655.
208. § 501, 110 Stat. at 3009-670.
209. § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-689.
210. For more on the 1996 Act, see generally INS Sends Instructions Highlighting
Provisions, Effective Dates of New Law, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1503 (Oct. 28, 1996);
INS, State Dep’t. Begin Implementing New Law, Congress Passes Corrections Bill, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417 (Oct. 11, 1996); President Signs Immigration Overhaul
Measure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317 (Oct. 7, 1996); President Signs Immigration
Overhaul Measure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317 (Oct. 7, 1996); Eleventh-Hour
Agreement Folds Immigration Bill Into Omnibus Spending Measure, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1281 (Sept. 30, 1996).
211. § 110 Stat. at 3009-558.
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stations at foreign airports to relieve Border Patrol agents of the
burden of handling admissibility issues at land borders.212
Section 133 of IIRIRA amended INA section 287 to allow the
Attorney General to enter into written agreements with states and
local subdivisions, which permitted state and local officers to receive
training and certification to become immigration enforcement
agents.213 IIRIRA replaced AEDPA’s summary exclusion
procedures214 with expedited removal provisions.215 Additionally,
IIRIRA imposed a one-year deadline on filing applications for
asylum.216 IIRIRA also created new inadmissibility grounds for
individuals who had remained “unlawfully present for more than 180
days and one year.”217 Under this provision, an individual who
overstayed his or her status by more than 180 days and voluntarily
departed the United States was inadmissible for three years.218
Individuals who overstayed their status by more than one year and
subsequently departed the United States were inadmissible for ten
years.219
With limited exceptions, a person who was present in the
United States without admission or parole, or who arrived at a place
other than a designated point of entry, was also inadmissible.220
Undocumented individuals who failed to attend their removal
proceedings “without reasonable cause” were inadmissible for five
years following their subsequent departure or removal from the
United States.221 F-1 students who violated a term or condition of
their status, including transferring from a private to a public school,
were inadmissible for a five-year period beginning from the date of
the violation.222

212. Id. at 3009-560.
213. Id. at 3009-563.
214. Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
215. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, §§ 301–09,
110 Stat. at 3009-575–628.
216. Id.
217. § 301(b)(B)(i)(I), 110 Stat. at 3009-576.
218. Id.
219. § 301(b)(B)(i)(II), 110 Stat. at 3009-576.
220. § 301(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-575–78.
221. INA § 212(a)(6)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B) (2017).
222. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, §§ 346, 625,
110 Stat. at 3009-638, 3009-699. F visas are non-immigrant student visas that allow
foreigners to pursue education in the United States. F-1 students must be enrolled
in and maintain a full course of study. See Aaron Larson, Student Visas, EXPERT
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IIRIRA also significantly changed both the nature of the hearing
process and immigrants’ rights in removal hearings. IIRIRA
eliminated the distinction between “deportation” hearings—which
formerly determined whether an individual was deportable—and
“exclusion” hearings—which formerly determined whether an
individual was inadmissible—lumping them all into “removal”
hearings.223 Additionally, IIRIRA granted subpoena powers to
immigration judges, enabling them to compel witnesses to appear to
testify on behalf of or against an alien subject to the court’s
jurisdiction.224 Removal hearings now required an alien to establish
his or her admissibility “clearly and beyond doubt.”225 IIRIRA
required those aliens who were admissible or admitted to prove that
they were lawfully present by “clear and convincing evidence.”226
“Suspension of deportation” relief was formerly available to
individuals of “good moral character” who were continually present
in the United States for at least seven years and who could show that
their deportation would create severe hardship to themselves or to a
spouse, parent, or child who was a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent
resident (LPR).227 Congress replaced the suspension of deportation
relief with two versions of a form of relief known as “cancellation of
removal”228: one available to LPRs, and the other available to those
who were not LPRs.229
For cancellation of removal relief, LPRs now must show they
have been an LPR “for not less than 5 years, [have] resided in the
United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in
any status, and [have] not been convicted of any aggravated
felony.”230 To qualify for the same type of relief, non-permanent
residents must show they have: (1) “been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years
immediately preceding the date of [their] application; [2] been a
person of good moral character during such period; [3] not been
LAW (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.expertlaw.com/library/immigration/student_
visas.html [https://perma.cc/TSF8-NXTB].
223. § 304, 110 Stat. at 3009-587.
224. Id. at 589.
225. INA § 240(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(2)(A).
226. INA § 240(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(2)(B).
227. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
228. INA § 212(c) was repealed and replaced with new INA § 240A(a) by Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §§ 304(b), 309(a).
229. Id.
230. § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2013).

2018] AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHERE WE ARE NOW 773

convicted of an offense” under several sections of the INA; and (4)
establish “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States” or an LPR.231 For both LPRs and
non-permanent residents, the “continuous period” ends if “the alien
is served a notice to appear” or if the alien commits certain
offenses.232
IV. EFFORTS TO LIMIT FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Subject only to constitutional limitations, Congress and the
executive branch have the authority to limit federal courts’
jurisdiction to review immigration.233 That said, the Supreme Court
has held that habeas corpus petitions may be heard in federal courts
because Congress has not stripped those courts of habeas corpus
jurisdiction.234 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
Administrative Procedure Act confers jurisdiction for federal court
review.235
Beginning in 1952, the basis for federal judicial review of
deportation orders has been by direct appeal from the Board of
Immigration Appeals, not from the federal district courts.236
Individuals could only appeal immigration agencies’ orders of
exclusion through habeas corpus.237 In 1996, Congress limited and
streamlined administrative and judicial appeals procedures.

231. These include all criminal and related grounds of inadmissibility, all
criminal grounds of deportability and grounds of deportability for failure to register
and falsification of documents. See INA §§ 212(a)(2); 237(a)(2)–(3), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2)–(3).
232. § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229A(d)(1) (2006).
233. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 705 (1893); see also Margaret Mikyung Lee, An Overview of Judicial
Review of Immigration Matter, CONG. RES. SERV., (Sept. 11, 2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N4Z-XZ58].
234. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308–09 (2001);
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367
(1974).
235. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52–53 (1955); Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51 (1950).
236. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952), 8 U.S.C. §§1101–1537 (2017).
237. Id.
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AEDPA,238 IIRIRA,239 and the REAL ID Act of 2005 restricted habeas
corpus and other indirect judicial review.240 Despite this, the
Supreme Court has continued its reluctance—absent a clear
statement of congressional intent—to hold that these statutes repeal
habeas corpus jurisdiction over removal.241
In 2011, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret
fundamental immigration law issues, with a significant issue being
the role of the federal government in states’ efforts to control illegal
immigration within their borders. For example, in Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting,242 the Court upheld an Arizona law that
permitted the state to revoke a business license on a showing that the
employer had employed an undocumented immigrant.243 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated:
Federal immigration law expressly preempts any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ . . . unauthorized aliens. . . . [T]he Legal Arizona
Workers Act . . . provides that the licenses of state
employers that knowingly or intentionally employ
unauthorized aliens may be, and in certain circumstances
must be, suspended or revoked. The law also requires that
all Arizona employers use a federal electronic verification
system to confirm that the workers they employ are legally
authorized workers. . . . Because we conclude that the
State’s licensing provisions fall squarely within the federal
statute’s savings clause and that the Arizona regulation
does not otherwise conflict with federal law, we hold that
the Arizona law is not preempted.244

238. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
239. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607–12, creating current INA § 242, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252.
240. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 302, 310–11
(2005).
241. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001);
Calcano-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 348, 348 (2001)
(“Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions.”).
242. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 587 (quotation and citation omitted).
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During the term that followed, the Supreme Court nullified
three of four provisions of Arizona Senate Bill 1070 in Arizona v.
United States,245 holding that federal immigration law preempted
these provisions.246 The Court struck down provisions that made it a
crime to be in Arizona without legal papers or for “an unauthorized
alien” to apply for or obtain a job in the state.247 The statute had also
allowed police “to arrest without a warrant a person ‘the officer
[had] probable cause to believe’” had committed a crime that could
lead to that person’s deportation.248 The Court further concluded,
however, that the federal government had presented an insufficient
record to nullify the provision of the statute permitting the police to
“make a reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status
of any person they stop, detain, or arrest” if the police believed the
person was in the country illegally.249 The Court left that provision
intact, while acknowledging that a lower court might potentially see
a challenge to that provision again.250As discussed in Part VII below,
the federal district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court
would once again be called upon to adjudicate important
immigration issues, soon after the beginning of the Trump
administration.
V. THE SHIFT OF IMMIGRATION POLICY TOWARD HOMELAND
SECURITY
A.

Effects of Economic Growth on Immigration and the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000

The U.S. economy enjoyed historic growth during the 1990s. In
fact, following the 1991 recession, the economy rebounded with the
longest running expansion in the nation’s history.251 This long

245. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
246. Id. at 399–400.
247. Id. at 416; see id. at 400, 403.
248. Id. at 394.
249. Id. at 411–14.
250. Id.
251. See Julie Hatch & Angela Clinton, Job Growth in the 1990s: A Retrospect,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (Dec. 1, 2000), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/12/
art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8Y7-QE5P]. See generally US Business Cycle
Expansions and Contraction, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Apr. 23, 2012 4:26 PM),
http://www.nber.org/cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_2
0120423.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VDZ-CU3M].
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expansion drove demand for skilled labor. The decade between
1990 and 2000 was a busy one for immigration lawyers and
immigration law administering agencies. Employment-based
immigrant quotas had substantially increased following the
enactment of IMMACT 90 in 1991.252
This increase in employment-based immigrant quotas created a
profound transformation for the United States’ employment-based
immigration system—one that transformed from having a severe
backlog of visa applications to having visas available to anyone who
met the new criteria.253 Demand for labor certifications and H-1B
visas, however, was so strong that the backlog for some
employment-based immigrant visas, primarily for nationals of India
and China, actually grew.254 What’s more, H-1B visa applications
started to exceed the allotted number far before the end of the fiscal
year.255
To address these developments, Congress passed the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21).256
AC21 addressed many of the hardships facing H-1B employees
attempting to maintain their lawful status while progressing toward
the goal of becoming an LPR. First, AC21 increased the number of
new H-1B visas available for fiscal years 1999–2003.257 AC21 also
exempted certain institutions of higher education, their related and
affiliated nonprofit entities, nonprofit research organizations, and

252. IMMACT 90 allowed 140,000 employment-based immigrants to enter the
United States each year, which was almost triple the amount allowed under previous
law. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 101(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 4987 (1990).
253. Compare BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULL. 6-49, VISA BULLETIN FOR
AUG. 1991 (1991), with BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULLETIN FOR OCT. 1991
(1991).
254. See Kenneth M. Geisler II, Fissures in the Valley: Searching for a Remedy for U.S.
Tech Workers Indirectly Displaced by H-1B Visa Outsourcing Firms, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
465, 469 (2017) (“The tech industry’s demand for H-1B workers greatly exceeds the
available supply, which is capped at 65,000 per year, albeit with plenty of
exceptions.”).
255. See, e.g., Jack McCarthy, Senator McCain to call for increase in H-1B Visas,
NETWORK WORLD (Aug. 23, 1999), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G155548274.html [https://perma.cc/55B6-5FPU].
256. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000).
257. Id. § 102(a) (amending Section 214(g)(1)(A) of the INA to allow 195,000
temporary workers and trainees to enter the United States in fiscal years 2001, 2002,
and 2003).
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governmental research organizations from the H-1B quota.258
Second, AC21 modified the way employment-based visas benefited
certain classes of immigrant visas259 by enabling H-1B workers to
change employers while the new employer’s H-1B petition was
pending.260 Third, AC21 allowed H-1B petitions to extend beyond
their normal six-year expiration in situations where labor
certification applications took longer than 365 days to process.261
Finally, AC21 recaptured unused immigrant visas and restructured
the amount of U.S. worker training fees that H-1B employers had to
pay for petitions, to National Science Foundation competitive grant
programs,262 and to other efforts to evaluate education and reduce
immigration backlogs.263
B.

Effects of 9/11 on Immigration Reform

The 9/11 terrorist attacks caused significant change to the
orientation of U.S. immigration laws and policies, reflecting a
greater emphasis on national security. Following the attacks,
Interpreter Releases—one of the oldest and most respected
immigration law periodicals—led its September 24 edition with the
following:
Reversing the momentum that had been building on
Capitol Hill toward a more immigration-friendly climate,
the tragic events of September 11, 2001, appear to have
rewritten the legislative agenda for the foreseeable future.
Lawmakers who several weeks ago were debating possible
new guest worker and earned legalization programs now
find themselves focused on a renewed round of border
build-up plans and heightened restrictions on
immigration.264
On September 19, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
delivered the Bush administration’s proposed antiterrorism package
to Congress.265 Eventually, Congress approved a new visa called the
258. Id. § 103.
259. Id. § 104(a).
260. Id. § 105.
261. Id. §§ 106(a), 106(c)(2).
262. Id. § 110.
263. Id. §§ 201–205.
264. Events of Sept. 11 Spur Revised Custody Procedures, Altered Legislative Landscape,
78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1493, 1493 (Sept. 24, 2001).
265. Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Justice Drafts New Rules for Deportation,
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S nonimmigrant visa.266 This new visa was issued to aliens who
possessed information concerning criminal or terrorist
organizations and who would supply (or had supplied) such
information to U.S. law enforcement agencies.267
The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001 (USA Act)
also barred immigrant admission to the United States for a wide
range of activities deemed to be supportive of terrorism. The USA
Act included several notable sections. For example, section 412
amended INA to allow authorized mandatory detention of terrorist
suspects and eliminated judicial review—by habeas corpus or
otherwise—for any alien who may have been “engaged in
any . . . activity that endanger[ed] the . . . United States.”268 Section
411 made the Act retroactive to all aliens regardless of when they
entered the United States.269 Section 413 amended INA to grant the
Secretary of State discretion to cooperate with other nations against
terrorists and provided for interagency data sharing.270
The USA Act passed the House of Representatives, and was later
combined with provisions of a separate Senate bill, the Visa Integrity
and Security Act of 2001.271 The Visa Integrity and Security Act
required the government to expeditiously and fully implement the
entry and exit data system mandated by section 110 of IIRIRA.272 In
turn, Congress incorporated provisions from the USA Act and the
Visa Integrity and Security Act into the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act),273 which represented
a compromise between the Senate and House bills. The process that
Congress used to obtain this compromise was unusual, and it

WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2001/09/19/justice-drafts-new-rules-for-deportation/06c03df4-2027-4123-ad79-2a
5ede5c8e2f/?utm_term=.c1c1eb7eeb5a [https://perma.cc/7JCM-D7UY].
266. H.R. 2500, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending INA § 214(k)); see 147 Cong.
Rec. S9387 (2001) (passing the measure in the Senate on September 13).
267. H.R. 2500.
268. USA Act of 2001, H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. § 412(a)(3)(B) (2001).
269. See id at § 411(c).
270. Id at § 413.
271. Visa Integrity and Security Act of 2001, H.R. 3077, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001).
272. Id.
273. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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angered some House Democrats.274 President Bush signed the USA
PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001.275
Soon after Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bush
administration led a comprehensive reorganization of the
immigration agencies. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA)
combined twenty-two federal agencies into one. 276 The HSA
abolished the INS and created the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) as the exclusive agency dealing with
adjudications and benefits programs.277 The reorganization
consolidated the U.S. Customs Service, and rolled the inspection of
borders and ports of entry into the Customs and Border Protection
(CBP).278 The government transferred all other customs and law
enforcement responsibilities, including detention and removal,
intelligence, and investigations, to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).279 These efforts did not, however, extend to
comprehensive reform of legal immigration.
Several years later, Congress made another attempt at
comprehensive immigration reform. In 2013, the Border Security,
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act
(S. 744) was introduced in the Senate.280 This bill was a bipartisan,
broad-based proposal meant to reform the U.S. immigration system.
It was co-sponsored by eight senators known as the “Gang of 8”:
Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY), John McCain (R-AZ), Richard
274. President Signs Far-Reaching Antiterrorism Bill, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1673,
1673 (Oct. 29, 2000); Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: Congress;
House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate’s, but With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/13/us/nation-challenged-congresshouse-passes-terrorism-bill-much-like-senate-s-but.html [perma.cc/HN86-W7LB]
(“Many lawmakers were outraged that a bipartisan bill, which had passed the
Judiciary Committee by a unanimous vote, was set aside for legislation negotiated at
the last minute by a very small group. Members rose to say that almost no one had
read the new bill, and pleaded for more time and more deliberation.”).
275. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
276. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(including sections establishing the Bureau of Border Security and Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services and abolishing the Immigration and
Naturalization Service).
277. Id. § 451(a)(1), at 2195.
278. 6 U.S.C. § 542 (codifying Reorganization Plan Modification for the
Department of Homeland Security, H. Doc. 108-32 (2003)).
279. Id.
280. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
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Durbin (D-IL), Lindsay Graham (R-SC), Robert Menendez (D-NJ),
Marco Rubio (R-FL), Michael Bennet (D-CO), and Jeff Flake
(R-AZ).281 The bill attempted to cover everything from the process
of immigrant legalization to the DREAM Act—including border
protection, 700 miles of fencing along the border, a mandatory
E-Verify employment verification system, changes in the family-based
and employment-based immigration categories, and removal.282
Before passing the Senate on a 68-32 vote, S. 744 had received
ninety-two amendments in the Judiciary Committee in addition to
amendments on the Senate floor.283 However, because the House of
Representatives refused to consider S. 744, the bill quietly died in
the 113th Congress.284 As of this writing, Congress has not
introduced any further legislation dealing as comprehensively with
immigration reform.
Conditioning immigration reform on U.S. border security has
been a recurring Republican refrain in recent years—essentially
deferring any other attempt at reforming legal immigration.285 As an
illustration of the partisan differences at issue, on October 26, 2006,
President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act of 2006,286
281. See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, Immigration’s Gang of 8: Who are They?, WASH. POST
(Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/01/28/
immigrations-gang-of-8-who-are-they/?utm_term=.eae399476b1e [https://perma.
cc/KX8Q-7JAM].
282. S. 744; see also A Guide to S.744: Understanding the 2013 Senate Immigration
Bill, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (July 10, 2013), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/research/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senate-immigration-bill [htt
ps://perma.cc/SB66-N9G8] (providing a summary of the bill).
283. Amanda Peterson Beadle, Senate Judiciary Committee Reaches Agreement on
Immigration Reform Bill, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (May 22, 2013),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/05/22/senate-judiciary-committee-reachesagreement-on-immigration-reform-bill/ [https://perma.cc/3VRS-VR4M].
284. House Speaker John Boehner defended his actions by stating that “the
American people and their elected officials don’t trust [President Obama] to
enforce the laws as written.” However, many believed the Republican congress
refused to consider the bill because there were no immediate benefits. See
Why Immigration Reform Died in Congress, NBC NEWS (July 1, 2014),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigration-reform-died-cong
ress-n145276 [https://perma.cc/HC6M-F82B].
285. This phenomenon is discussed in a succinct review of the Southern Border
Initiative Network (SBInet). See John J. Hudak et al., Hitting the Wall: On Immigration,
Campaign Promises Clash with Policy Realities, BROOKINGS CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB.
MGMT. (June 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
gs_06222017_dhs_immigration.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G27-QMCM].
286. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006).
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saying: “This bill will help protect the American people. This bill will
make our borders more secure. It is an important step toward
immigration reform.”287 The Secure Fence Act resulted in an effort
called the Southern Border Initiative Network (SBInet).288 But only
four years later, President Barack Obama dropped the SBInet
initiative amid concerns over its expense and effectiveness.289
Despite those factors, President Donald Trump raised the ante by
making a border wall—as opposed to a fence—along the
southwestern U.S. border a centerpiece of his successful presidential
campaign.290
The debate over U.S. border security is largely the result of a
lack of agreement on what constitutes a “secure border.” By one
measure—comparing current to historical successful illegal
entries—the United States seems to be approaching “secure.” For
example, a recent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office
of Immigration Statistics report estimated that 55 to 85% of
attempted illegal border crossings were unsuccessful,291 up from 35
to 70% a decade ago.292 Estimated successful illegal entries into ports
of entry plummeted from 1,800,000 in 2000 to fewer than 200,000 in
2016.293
However, this data does not account for the number of
individuals who overstay their visa statuses. In 2016, DHS produced

287. President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Oct. 26,
2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20
061026.html [https://perma.cc/9UQ7-TZAP].
288. Elaine Kamarack, Why the Wall on the Mexican Border Won’t Happen,
BROOKINGS (April 25, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/
04/25/why-the-wall-on-the-mexican-border-wont-happen/ [https://perma.cc/E37
S-4BZR].
289. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-331, SOUTHWEST BORDER
SECURITY: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS FENCING CONTRIBUTIONS
TO OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING CAPABILITY GAPS (2017).
290. Jordan Fabian & Jonathan Easley, Trump Bets Base Will Stick with Him on
Immigration, THE HILL (Sep. 18, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/ad
ministration/350947-trump-bets-base-will-stick-with-him-on-immigration [https://
perma.cc/N2ZL-9S45].
291. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, EFFORTS BY DHS TO ESTIMATE
SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 19 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0914_estimates-of-bord
er-security.pdf [https://perma.cc/P62Q-KDGY].
292. Id.
293. Id. at 18 (demonstrated by figure 10).
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the first approximation of this figure,294 estimating that out of the
forty-five million U.S. arrivals by air or sea whose business or tourist
visas expired in fiscal year 2015, about 416,500 were still in the
United States.295 The highest numbers of overstays were by
Canadians, Mexicans, and Brazilians.296
In April 2017, DHS released a new report reflecting that, of
2016’s fifty million visitors to the United States (including students,
tourist/business visitors, and workers), 629,000 had overstayed their
visas.297 Unlike the 2016 report, the 2017 report included overstays
of all nonimmigrant classes, not just tourists and business visitors.298
The 2017 report disclosed that the percent of overstays was just over
one percent of all nonimmigrants admitted.299Judging from these
data, it would be difficult to argue that the United States has porous
borders and an excessive number of overstays. However, many still
argue that the southwestern U.S. border is not secure, based largely
on the government’s inability to account for departures.300
VI. THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Through executive action, President Obama achieved some of
what he was unable to achieve legislatively.301 Depending on one’s
294. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2015 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY%2015%
20DHS%20Entry%20and%20Exit%20Overstay%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QH84-5HQL].
295. Id. at 7.
296. Id. at 10–15.
297. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2016 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Entry%20
and%20Exit%20Overstay%20Report%2C%20Fiscal%20Year%202016.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/KX9Y-C7V2].
298. Id. at 11–30.
299. Id. at 40–41.
300. Chief among these critics is FAIR, which has consistently argued that the
rate of overstays and the inadequacy of the United States to biometrically match
entering aliens with departing aliens places all of the immigration statistics in
question. See, e.g., Visa Overstayers, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM (2013),
https://fairus.org/issue/legal-immigration/visa-overstayers
[https://perma.cc/2TFH-WWNE].
301. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Once Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama Has Come
to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/u
[https://perma.cc/4CXT-M5EE]
s/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html
(suggesting that, due to Republican challenges on most of his agenda, President
Obama relied upon executive power to accomplish what he could not with
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perspective, President Obama either compensated for a failure to
enact immigration reform by refocusing enforcement priorities and
deporting record numbers of undocumented immigrant
populations,302 or he dismantled immigration enforcement
altogether.303 Both sides would likely agree, however, that President
Obama revised enforcement priorities and adopted administrative
actions to carry out those priorities. During his two terms, President
Obama oversaw the removal of three million undocumented
immigrants304—more than any president before him, and one
million more than President George W. Bush.305 President Obama’s
administrative actions led many in the immigration rights
community to refer to him as the “deporter-in-chief.”306 The Obama
administration aggressively enforced employer sanctions laws,
issuing over thirteen times more fines against employers than
President Bush’s administration.307 Viewed objectively, President
Obama’s administration was arguably the most enforcementoriented administration in our nation’s history.
“legislative transparency”).
302. President Obama’s Legacy on Immigration, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Jan. 20,
2017), http://immigrationimpact.com/2017/01/20/president-obamas-legacy-im
migration/ [https://perma.cc/2XRS-W46R] (“[P]artisan divides emerged, and an
intransigent Congress [blocked him]. . . . While [Obama] failed to get a
comprehensive immigration reform law passed, he took [some] important
[protectionist] steps. . . . However, deportations rose to record highs, and some of
the most vulnerable immigrant populations continue to suffer.”).
303. See FED’N OF AM.’S FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD OF
DISMANTLING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 2009-2015, at 1 (2016), https://fairus.
[https://perma.cc/
org/sites/default/files/2017-10/ObamaTimeline_2016.pdf
RT63-5JT5] (offering that from 2009 to early 2016, “the Obama administration
ha[d] systematically gutted effective immigration enforcement policies, moved
aggressively against State and local governments that attempt[ed] to enforce
immigration laws, and stretched the concept of “prosecutorial discretion” to a point
where it . . . rendered many immigration laws meaningless”).
304. Table 39. Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1982 to 2015, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearb
ook/2015/table39 [https://perma.cc/5FLP-CUSW].
305. See id.
306. Muzaffar Chishti et al., The Obama Record on Deportations: Deporter in
Chief or Not?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.migration
policy.org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not [https://per
ma.cc/X5RR-CFFA].
307. See BRUNO, supra note 110, at 5. This calculation eliminates the first year of
each man’s term as President as carry-over from the prior administration’s
initiatives. Id.
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From a leniency perspective, Obama’s policy directives leading
to the creation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program308 protected more than three-quarters of a million
undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as
children.309 However, the Obama administration’s attempt to create
a new class of protected undocumented immigrants—parents of
United States citizens—failed to survive a federal court challenge by
twenty-six states.310 Through 2014, President Obama had maintained
approximately the same number of undocumented immigrants in
the United States—between 11.1 and 11.5 million—since he was first
sworn into office in 2009.311
VII. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION
Immigration was one of President Donald Trump’s central
campaign themes.312 Before taking office, President Trump often
308. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN (June
15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discreti
on-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F32J-4GK6].
President Obama was not the originator of prosecutorial discretion. The public first
became aware of such a discretionary enforcement program in the 1970s. See Leon
Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes Public:
The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 42–43
(1976).
309. Jens Manuel Krogstad, DACA Has Shielded Nearly 790,000 Young Unauthorized
Immigrants from Deportation, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Sep. 1, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/01/unauthorized-immigrants-co
vered-by-daca-face-uncertain-future/ [https://perma.cc/3YZ5-BCEZ].
310. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (affirming, with an
equally divided Supreme Court, the district court’s order enjoining the DACA
expansion and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) order); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D.
Tex. 2015) (blocking President Obama’s DACA expansion order and another order
establishing DAPA).
311. See Unauthorized Immigrant Population Trends for States, Birth Countries and
Regions, PEW RES. CTR (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/un
authorized-trends/ [https://perma.cc/BRG2-HUM7].
312. Positions, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions [https://perma.cc/79QJ-A6EC] (listing
immigration reform as one of the five key positions of the Trump campaign); see
also Immigration Reform that Will Make America Great Again, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR
PRESIDENT (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigrationreform [https://perma.cc/37KB-F58Z] (providing the Trump campaign’s position
statement on immigration reform).
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used his personal Twitter account to express an anti-immigrant
reform platform. Trump’s April 1, 2013 tweet, for example, stated:
“Immigration reform is all risk for the @GOP. Their base doesn’t
want it and the 12M illegals will all vote Democrat.”313 Eighty-five
percent of those who voted for President Trump supported building
a wall, and eighty-three percent favored deporting undocumented
immigrants.314 President Trump’s supporters largely still support
these initiatives.315 A group of individuals with ties to anti-immigrant
advocacy groups—the Federation for American Immigration
Reform in particular—have crafted many of President Trump’s
policies.316 Ironically, although President Trump strongly criticized
313. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/318808732211503105?lang=en [htt
ps://perma.cc/A2E3-BQRA].
314. Exit Polls, CNN (Nov. 23, 2016, 11:58 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/
election/results/exit-polls [https://perma.cc/5YWV-GPAC].
315. See Fabian & Easley, supra note 290. But see David A. Graham, Trump’s
Shrinking, Energized Base, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2017/09/trumps-shrinking-impassioned-base/539160/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/9YX3-GFNG] (suggesting that Trump’s overall base support is
decreasing, leaving only the most impassioned in Trump’s base).
316. See Tess Owen, A Radical Anti-Immigration Group Infiltrated the GOP. Now It’s
in the White House, VICE (May 3, 2017, 9:17 AM), https://news.vice.com/en_ca/arti
cle/mb9nb3/fair-trump-white-house-federation-for-american-immigration-reform
[http://perma.cc/HK25-6WAC] (emphasizing the close ties between FAIR and
influential advisers to President Trump, including Julie Kirchner, Jeff Sessions, Kris
Kobach, Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, and Lou Barletta). Although FAIR and
CIS have vigorously rejected the characterization, the Southern Poverty Law Center
has likened them to “hate groups” and has made background materials available on
its website. See Heidi Beirich, Hate Groups Like Center for Immigration Studies Want You
to Believe They’re Mainstream, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/03/23/hate-groups-center-immigrati
on-studies-want-you-believe-they%E2%80%99re-mainstream [https://perma.cc/
XZB6-BTEX]. FAIR and the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) are regularly
quoted in mainstream media as authoritative voices for reduced immigration and
comprise a dominant policy role in the Trump administration. Maria Santana, Hardline Anti-illegal Immigration Advocates Hired at 2 Federal Agencies, CNN (Apr. 12, 2017,
12:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/11/politics/trump-administrationimmigration-advisers/index.html [https://perma.cc/P3LU-SDN6]; see also Betsy
Woodruff, Trump Making ‘Nativist’ Group’s Wish List a Reality, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar.
13, 2017, 1:03 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-making-nativist-groupswish-list-a-reality [https://perma.cc/PHG3-LBRN] (“A number of the 79 items on
the list composed by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), have either been
implemented or shown up in leaked draft proposals from the [Trump]
administration.”).
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President Obama’s use of the executive powers, the fledgling Trump
presidency has almost exclusively used policy-making and executive
orders to advance its anti-immigrant theme.317 But this strategy has
not always served the Trump administration well in the courts.318 As
of the time of this writing, President Trump has signed orders
addressing border security, interior enforcement, refugees, and visa
holders from designated countries.319
A.

The Travel Bans

Initially, federal district and circuit courts enjoined all of
President Trump’s travel ban orders.320 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court stayed (but significantly modified) the injunction on
President Trump’s second travel ban order.321 In its order granting
the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court modified
the ban with respect to “foreign nationals who [had] a credible claim
of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United
States” such as a “close relative” or a relationship that was “formal,

317. See Tina Vasquez, Trump’s Administration Spent 2017 Targeting Even More
People for Deportation, REWIRE (Dec. 21, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://rewire.news/article/
2017/12/21/trumps-administration-spent-2017-expanding-targeting-deportation/
[https://perma.cc/N57B-F4NL] (cataloging the Trump administration’s efforts in
immigration policy after his first year in office); Tai Kopan, Trump’s Executive Orders
Dramatically Expand Power of Immigration Officers, CNN (Jan. 28, 2017, 2:50 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-immigration-detentiondeportations-enforcement/index.html [https://perma.cc/6H26-F6VB].
318. See, e.g., Julie Rheinstrom, Current Developments: One Hundred Days of President
Trump’s Executive Orders, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 444–45 (2017) (juxtaposing
President Obama’s executive actions—DACA and DAPA, as well planned legal
endeavors—against President Trump’s “lack of preparedness and planning” with
his executive orders, which has led to “successful challenges to [his executive]
orders [that have] hinged on this haphazardness”).
319. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (the second
“Muslim” travel ban); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017);
Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
320. See Matt Zapotosky, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Third Travel Ban, THE
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/federal-judge-blocks-trumps-third-travel-ban/2017/10/17/e73293fc-ae9011e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.1e6701cdb88f [https://perma.cc/
3KK3-XUB9].
321. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); see
also Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017).
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documented, and formed in the ordinary course rather than for
purposes of evading EO–2.”322
Most recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
enjoined a third travel ban executive order on similar grounds as the
injunction against the second travel ban.323 Namely, the court found
that the executive order exceeded the executive power granted to
President Trump by Congress under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) because it
lacked sufficient findings that the entry of 150 million people from
the six specified countries would be “detrimental to the interests of
the United States.”324 Additionally, the court found that the
executive order violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of nationality when issuing immigrant
visas.325 The third travel ban case, Hawaii v. Trump, remains before
the United States Supreme Court, which granted the government’s
petition for a writ of certiorari on January 19, 2018 and heard oral
arguments April 25, 2018.326

322. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. Lawsuits challenging the
travel ban were initiated in New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, Washington, and
Hawaii. In Washington v. Trump, the court issued a national temporary restraining
order that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). A second
travel ban order (Executive Order, No. 13780) was also enjoined, which sought to,
among other things, reduce the covered countries to six (eliminating Iraq), clarify
that the earlier order was not “motivated by animus toward any religion” or applied
to “any minority religion” in suspending the refugee program for one hundred
twenty days, include Syrian refugees, and reduce the number of refugees to be
resettled in the U.S. in 2017 from 110,000 to 50,000. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6,
2017).
323. See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017). The Ninth
Circuit sustained the portions of the executive order that banned the entry of
persons from the designated countries, suspending the refugee program, and
reducing the cap of refugees. The Ninth Circuit allowed the internal reviews to go
forward. See Hawaii, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. In its decision granting the
government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court granted certiorari and
modified the ban to leave it in place with respect to “foreign nationals who have a
credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United
States” such as a “close relative” or a relationship that is “formal, documented, and
formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO–2.”
Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088.
324. Hawaii, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1119.
325. Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2086.
326. Hawaii, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 cert. granted, No. 17-965, 2018 WL 324357,
at *1 (Jan. 19, 2018). Oral arguments were heard in the case and it was
submitted for decision on April 25, 2018. See Trump v. Hawaii, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/trump-v-hawaii-3/ [https://perma.cc
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DACA and Sanctuary Cities

More recent federal court decisions challenging President
Trump’s executive actions relate to his decision to end the DACA
program.327 In Regents of University of California v. Department of
Homeland Security, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California blocked President Trump’s decision to end the DACA
program,328 imposing a nationwide preliminary injunction on the
executive action. The court’s decision contained a thoughtful history
of Deferred Action329 and the DACA program, which plaintiff Janet
Napolitano had implemented several years earlier when she was
DHS Secretary.330 The court found that the rescission of DACA
substantially relied on Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions’
assessment that DACA was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority
by the Executive Branch.”331 The resulting nationwide preliminary
injunction permitted the government to resume accepting DACA
extensions.332 This injunction was soon followed by a similar order
entered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York.333 The Trump administration has attempted, unsuccessfully, to
have both decisions considered directly by the Supreme Court.334
The litigation concerning the legality of President Trump’s attempt
to terminate DACA is particularly significant because DACA
constitutes an important component of the (thus far unsuccessful)
/C2ML-MMGQ] (last visited June 20, 2018).
327. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/09/05/rescission-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc
/9VNF-5F9G]; President Donald J. Trump Restores Responsibility and the Rule of Law to
Immigration, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefi
ngs-statements/president-donald-j-trump-restores-responsibility-rule-law-immigrati
on/ [https://perma.cc/HV4W-9G7U].
328. No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017 WL 4642324, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017).
329. Id. at 2–6.
330. Id. at 6–12.
331. Id. at 12.
332. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Response to January 2018 Preliminary
Injunction, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-response-january-2018-prelimina
ry-injunction [https://perma.cc/WH37-SC49].
333. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 834074, at *24–25 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2018).
334. See Order List, U.S. SUPREME COURT at 2, 5 (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022618zor_j426.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/3MN8-ZPL5].
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attempts by the Trump administration and Congress to arrive at
agreement on various aspects of legislative immigration reform.335
President Trump has also sought to take on so-called “sanctuary
cities,” ultimately culminating in Executive Order 13768 of January
25, 2017, which attempted to deny federal funds to sanctuary
cities.336 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California temporarily enjoined this order,337 and the lawsuit
remains pending at the time of this writing.
The brewing dispute between the Trump administration and
several states over the issue of sanctuary cities and the states’
unwillingness to participate in immigration enforcement presents an
interesting variation on local control issues. Typically, states wishing
to more fully engage in immigration enforcement have asserted the
local control argument.338 In the sanctuary cities debate, however,
the local control argument is just the opposite; local governmental
entities argue that it is their right not to enforce federal immigration
laws because of conflicting fiscal and law enforcement priorities.339
On February 22, 2018, President Trump attacked the State of
California’s reluctance to engage in immigration enforcement and
stated that he may pull ICE out of California, a decision that runs
contrary to his policy of increased immigration enforcement by the
Federal government.340
335. See infra Part VII.D.
336. Exec. Order No. 13786, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
337. City of Seattle v. Trump challenged the threatened federal fund cuts to
“sanctuary cities.” No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19,
2017); see also County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The Northern District
of California (San Francisco) issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on April
25, 2017. Id. at 539. On September 18, 2017, the Trump administration appealed
Judge Orrick’s April 25 preliminary injunction and July 20 order denying
defendants’ motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration to the Ninth Circuit.
Id. The Ninth Circuit opened a docket for the appeal, No. 17-16886. City and
County of San Francisco v. Donald Trump, et al, 17-16886. On January 4, 2018,
Judge William Orrick of the Ninth Circuit granted appellees’ motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot. Id. All pending motions were denied as moot as well, and the appeal
was dismissed. Id.
338. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 242–49.
339. See Brief of Appellee at 11–19, County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-17480
(9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/cco/Documents/O_
County%27s%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX9B-CBBZ].
340. Elliot Spagat and Ken Thomas, Trump Mulls Pulling Immigration Agents From
California, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018, 8:46 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
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Memoranda to Immigration Agencies

Despite legal setbacks, the Trump administration has been
largely successful in directing immigration agencies to take a harder
line on immigrants, both undocumented and documented, through
a combination of executive orders and memoranda. For example, in
a Presidential Memorandum dated March 16, 2017,341 President
Trump gave the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary
of Homeland Security directives to “implement protocols and
procedures as soon as practicable that in their judgment [would]
enhance the screening and vetting of applications for visas and all
other immigration benefits, so as to increase the safety and security
of the American people.”342 The additional protocols and
procedures from the memorandum suggested greater focus on the
following:
(1) preventing the entry into the United States of foreign
nationals who may aid, support, or commit violent,
criminal, or terrorist acts; and
(2) ensuring the proper collection of all information
necessary to rigorously evaluate all grounds of
inadmissibility or deportability, or grounds for the denial
of other immigration benefits.343
Furthermore, in the memorandum, President Trump also directed
agencies to:
[R]igorously enforce all existing grounds of inadmissibility
and to ensure subsequent compliance with related laws
after admission. The heads of all relevant executive
departments and agencies shall issue new rules,
regulations, or guidance (collectively, rules), as
appropriate, to enforce laws relating to such grounds of
inadmissibility and subsequent compliance. To the extent
that the Secretary of Homeland Security issues such new
rules, the heads of all other relevant executive departments
and agencies shall, as necessary and appropriate, issue new

politics/articles/2018-02-22/trump-scolds-california-for-no-help-in-fighting-ms-13gang.
341. Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to the Sec’y of
State, the Attorney Gen., and the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-secretary-state-at
torney-general-secretary-homeland-security/ [https://perma.cc/SW3S-CGJL].
342. Id.
343. Id.
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rules that conform to them. Such new rules shall supersede
any previous rules to the extent of any conflict.344
Prior even to the President’s memorandum, in two separate
memoranda,345 then-DHS Secretary John Kelly announced several
initiatives intended to increase the enforcement of U.S. immigration
laws. One initiative was to strip basic legal protections from the
undocumented children arriving alone at the U.S. border—and to
penalize their parents who sought to reunite with their children in
the United States—by narrowing the definition of “unaccompanied
alien child”346 and launching either civil or criminal enforcement
against the parents.347
Secretary Kelly’s memorandum was quickly followed by a
memorandum from Attorney General Sessions, dated April 11,
2017,348 to all federal prosecutors, emphasizing the need for
“consistent and vigorous enforcement” that would “disrupt
organizations and deter unlawful conduct.”349 The Sessions
memorandum stressed that districts “shall consider prosecution for
any case involving the unlawful transportation or harboring of aliens,

344. Id.
345. Memorandum from John Kelly, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Sec’y, to Kevin
McAleenan, Thomas D. Homan, Lori Scialabba, Joseph B. Maher, Dimple Shah,
and Chip Fulghum (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publ
ications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-NationalInterest.pdf [https://perma.cc/E849-TZSE] (on the “Enforcement of the
Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest”); Memorandum from John Kelly,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Sec’y, to Kevin McAleenan, Thomas D. Homan, Lori
Scialabba, Joseph B. Maher, Dimple Shah, and Chip Fulghum (Feb. 20, 2017)
[hereinafter Implementing], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcem
ent-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTX-AAVL] (“Implementing
the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements
Policies”).
346. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008, P. L. 110–457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044, 5074–5075 (2008); see also IMMIGRANT
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS (UACS) & NEW EXECUTIVE
ORDERS 1 (March 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/uacs_
under_trump_administration_final_3.21.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P3B-MUJB].
347. Implementing, supra note 345.
348. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., to All
Federal Prosecutors (April 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/956841/download [https://perma.cc/YM99-AKJR] (on the “Renewed
Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement”).
349. Id.
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or any other conduct proscribed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324.”350
Prosecutors were to give priority to charging individuals who had
transported or harbored three or more aliens.351 The memorandum
also encouraged Assistant U.S. Attorneys to consider charging
individuals with felonies who had “two or more misdemeanor
improper entry convictions with aggravated circumstances, such as
gang membership or affiliation, multiple prior voluntary returns,
prior removal, deportation or exclusion or other aggravating
circumstances.”352 Essentially, these directives ate at the heart of trial
attorneys’ ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion for
immigration enforcement, given that the Attorney General
supervises the Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. attorneys, and all
of the government trial attorneys.353
Another initiative expanded detention of undocumented
immigrants, including a requirement that DHS “detain nearly
everyone it apprehends” at or near the border.354 Additionally, the
pertinent memoranda proposed expanding the group of
undocumented persons in the interior of the country—not just those
at the border—who would be subject to expedited deportation
without going before an immigration judge.355 Expanding

350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See Matthew James Hannon Redavid Jr., Revamping Procedural Due Process for
Illegal Aliens: Applying A Categorical Approach to Prosecutorial Discretion in Removal
Proceedings, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 891–92 (2015) (describing the “application
of prosecutorial discretion to illegal aliens in removal proceedings” as “a case-bycase balancing of the equities either grants the alien the opportunity to remain in
the United States or face removal”); Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Immigration Context After the 2013 ICE Directive: Families Are
Still Being Torn Apart, 42 W. ST. L. REV. 25, 30 (2014) (describing prosecutorial
discretion in immigration cases as deferred action, which is “an act of administrative
convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority, if the alien
establishes an economic necessity for employment” and “merely the decision not to
prosecute someone at the given moment” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)
(2014)).
354. Summary and Analysis of DHS Memorandum “Implementing the President’s
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies, AM. IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASS’N (Feb. 28, 2017), www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/70840
[https://perma.cc/2QLV-48BT] (describing the “policies regarding the
apprehension and detention of aliens described in section 235 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act”).
355. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 20, 2017).
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“expedited removal” would allow the government to bypass the
backlogged immigration courts in an effort to deport people rapidly,
with little to no due process and no recourse of federal judicial
review.356 This expansion would mean that more children, families,
and other vulnerable groups seeking protection in the United States
would end up detained, at great financial and human cost.357
The new memoranda rescinded earlier policies that
deprioritized persons who posed no threat to communities.358 The
new enforcement priorities are extremely broad, covering nearly all
undocumented individuals in the United States, including
individuals charged with (or suspected of having committed) crimes,
and individuals who, in the judgment of the immigration officer,
“otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.”359 These
policies would make virtually all undocumented immigrants
priorities for arrest, detention, and removal. The memoranda
directed the hiring of 5,000 additional CBP agents and 10,000
additional ICE agents.360 The memoranda also ordered an expanded
implementation of INA section 287(g),361 allowing DHS to enter into
written agreements with states or other political subdivisions to allow
state and local law enforcement officers to perform the functions of
immigration agents.362
The Trump administration’s aggressive policies concerning
removal of undocumented immigrants have not targeted criminal
aliens, but have instead been directed at virtually all out-of-status
356. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2141.
357. THOMAS BLOOD & BRUCE HENDERSON, STATE OF THE UNION 44 (1996).
358. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Federal Regulatory Policymaking and Enforcement of
Immigration Law, in COMPASSIONATE MIGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN THE
AMERICAS 53 (Steven W. Bender & William F. Arrocha eds., 2017).
359. Exec. Order No. 13786, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
360. Lisa Rein, Trump Plan to Hire 15,000 Border and Immigration Personnel Isn’t
Justified, Federal Watchdog Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-plan-to-hire-15000-border-and-immigration-personnel-is
nt-justified-federal-watchdog-says/2017/08/02/c9345136-77a1-11e7-8839-ec48ec4c
ae25_story.html?utm_term=.2a2303c2f79e [https://perma.cc/A5P2-USQ4].
361. 8 U.S.C § 1357(g) (2006); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, Delegation
of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/6VHH-EKH3].
362. Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in Immigration
Enforcement and Related Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-assistance-immigrationenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ4T-3Y3P].
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individuals.363 As an immediate result of these policies, the backlog
in removal cases has risen from 437,000 at the beginning of fiscal
year 2015 to over 692,000 as of March 2018.364
Recently, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
suggested that it will evaluate immigration judges based on the
number of cases the judges adjudicate.365 The EOIR published a
January 17, 2018, memorandum redirecting case priorities and
specifying “Immigration Court Benchmarks and Performance
Metrics.”366 The EOIR also updated its Guidelines for Immigration
Court Cases Involving Juveniles, Including Unaccompanied Alien
Children367 and its Applications for Cancellation of Removal or
Suspension of Deportation that are Subject to the Cap.368

363. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
364. See generally Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and
Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438 (2017) (discussing the 2015 backlog and
options to improve the court system). For the current backlog, see Syracuse Univ.,
Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of March 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php [https:
//perma.cc/4PYN-NPEC] (last visited June 20, 2018).
365. NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, NAIJ HAS GRAVE CONCERNS REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF QUOTAS ON IMMIGRATION JUDGE PERFORMANCE REVIEWS 3 (2017),
https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_-_Concerns_Regar
ding_Implementation_of_Quotas_10-17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2U5-9JSW].
366. See Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Director of Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, to the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, All Immigration
Judges, All Court Administrators, and All Immigration Court Staff (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download [https://perma.cc/
24UC-3FZM] (regarding “Case Priorities and Immigration Court Performance
Measures”).
367. See Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors and Judicial
Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff (Dec. 20, 2017)
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/oppm17-03/download [https://perma.cc/B8X
X-UDW2] (rescinding and replacing OPPM 07-01, Guidelines for Immigration Court
Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children, dated May 22, 2007).
368. See Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors and Judicial
Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/oppm17-04/download [https://perma.cc/ER
P2-JWDU] (titled “Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-04:
Applications for Cancellation of Removal or Suspension of Deportation that are Subject to the
Cap”).
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In 1996, IRIRA had directed United States Attorneys to institute
criminal prosecution for the highest-level offenses of those bringing
undocumented immigrants into the United States.369 In contrast, the
new Trump-era policies are not limited to undocumented
immigrants, but also extend to adjudications related to legal
immigration. For example, acting under the authority of an
executive order directed at hiring U.S. workers before foreign
workers,370 USCIS has generated many Requests for Evidence to
H-1B and other visa petitions to classify foreign employees within
legal statuses.371 Moreover, a recent Trump administration decision
increases the supervision of H-1B employers after the employment
of visa holders has begun.372
Yet another memorandum issued by the Trump administration
revised and tightened USCIS review of circumstances underlying
nonimmigrant workers who are sponsored by one employer but
work on the site of another as a contractor.373 These relationships
often exist between consulting firms and customers in the United
States. The new policy memorandum will significantly raise the
369. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
370. Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017).
371. See Ashlyn Still, Visas for Skilled Foreigners Attract More Scrutiny, REUTERS,
http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-IMMIGRATION-EMPLOYMEN
T/010050QC1NF/index.html?graphic=1 [https://perma.cc/PZ34-4Q2M].
372. See Gregory A. Wald, US Immigration 2018: Change Will Be the Constant, NAT’L
L. REV. (2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-immigration-2018change-will-be-constant [https://perma.cc/AXJ5-YQUC] (“Within a few weeks of
the BAHA executive order, the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)
departed from long-standing practice and started to issue requests for evidence
(RFEs) challenging entry-level H-1B petitions.”); Memorandum from U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-10-23Rescission-of-DeferencePM6020151.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KV-TJSV] (directing staff to no longer defer
to previous immigration decisions but to adjudicate each case on its merits).
372. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Updates
Policy to Ensure Petitioners Meet Burden of Proof for Nonimmigrant Worker
Extension Petitions (Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter October 2017 Immigration Press
Release], https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-updates-policy-ensurepetitioners-meet-burden-proof-nonimmigrant-worker-extension-petitions [https://
perma.cc/YW2F-QGHD].
373. See Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (Feb. 22,
2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018
/2018-02-22-PM-602-0157-Contracts-and-Itineraries-Requirements-for-H-1B.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/T5EP-5GPP].
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documentation required of an H-1B employer to prove that the
assignment of an H-1B worker to a customer falls within the scope of
the H-1B work authority.374
The Trump administration also rescinded a former policy
directing USCIS adjudicators to give deference to a previous officer’s
approval of a nonimmigrant petition. Now, USCIS will review all
extensions as if they had not been previously approved.375
Moreover, beginning October 1, 2017, USCIS reinstated the
adjustment-of-status interview of all I-140 applicants for permanent
residence.376 The agency now known as USCIS had abandoned these
interviews as a normal part of the employment-based I-140
procedure in 1996.377 At that time, the government considered the
interviews to be an inefficient use of resources and allowed the INS
to waive the interview whenever the agency thought it was
appropriate.378
On February 22, 2018, the Trump administration dramatically
changed the USCIS mission statement by omitting any reference to
“America’s promise as a nation of immigrants,” instead placing an
emphasis on safeguarding the integrity of the agency’s lawful
immigration system while protecting Americans and their values and
securing the homeland.379 Although this constitutes a radical shift in

374. Id. at 4–5.
375. October 2017 Immigration Press Release, supra note 372.
376. See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS to
Expand In-Person Interview Requirements for Certain Permanent Residency
Applicants (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-toexpand-in-person-interview-requirements-for-certain-permanent-residency-applica
nts [https://perma.cc/WWD6-LXV2]. An I-140 application is a form to “petition
for an alien worker to become a permanent resident in the United States.” U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., I-140, Immigrant
Petition for Alien Worker (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/i-140 [https://perm
a.cc/946U-G6XW].
377. Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence:
Interview, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,825–59,827 (Dec. 26, 1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
245.6).
378. Id.
379. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Director L.
Francis Cissna on New Agency Mission Statement (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-director-l-francis-cissna-new-agen
cy-mission-statement [https://perma.cc/MUD6-MMVH]. The previous USCIS
mission statement read as follows: “USCIS secures America’s promise as a nation of
immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our customers,
granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and
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the guiding principles of USCIS, such a shift appears to be in line
with the priorities of the Trump administration, as evidenced by the
policy memoranda issued by the administration since President
Trump assumed office in January 2017.
D.

The Trump Administration’s Proposed Regulations

In the fall of 2017, the Trump administration published its
proposed list of regulations.380 This list included a number of
regulations directed at current immigration standards and
procedures, border control and protection, ICE interior
enforcement procedures, and those involving USCIS legal
immigration statuses and procedures.381 These proposals were
wide-ranging and included expanding expedited removal
procedures from the border into the interior of the United States.382
The proposals also altered procedures to detain families—including
children—in detention facilities.383
The regulatory proposals did not stop with those directed at
illegal immigration. For example, the proposals included raising fees
that foreign students must pay and limiting practical training
opportunities for certain nonimmigrant students.384 Among the
understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration
system.” Richard Gonzales, America No Longer ‘A Nation of Immigrants,’ USCIS Says,
NPR (Feb. 22, 2018, 6:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/02/22/588097749/america-no-longer-a-nation-of-immigrants-uscis-says
[https://perma.cc/NA6G-F2YK]. The new mission statement, as it appears on the
agency’s website, reads: “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the
nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by
efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while
protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values.” About
Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus
[https://perma.cc/D97Y-8WZR] (last updated Mar. 6, 2018).
380. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INTRODUCTION TO THE FALL 2017
REGULATORY PLAN (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticCo
ntent/201710/VPStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8TW-LXGH]; see also
Fall 2017 Statement of Regulatory Priorities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201710/Statement_
1600.html [https://perma.cc/FM5W-CDN4].
381. Fall 2017 Statement of Regulatory Priorities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201710/Statement_
1600.html [https://perma.cc/FM5W-CDN4].
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See id.
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proposals was a curious one—at least from the perspective of a
business entrepreneur like President Trump—that would rescind a
final Obama administration rule that established:
[A] program that would allow for consideration of parole
into the United States . . . certain inventors, researchers,
and entrepreneurs who had established a U.S. start-up
entity, and who had been awarded substantial U.S. investor
financing or otherwise hold the promise of innovation and
job creation through the development of new technologies
or the pursuit of cutting edge research.385
Another proposal would rescind the final Obama
administration rule extending eligibility for employment
authorization to certain H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B
nonimmigrants who were seeking employment-based LPR status.386
Yet another would target the H-1B visa status by establishing:
[A]n electronic registration program for H-1B petitions
subject to annual numerical limitations [that] would
improve the H-1B numerical limitation allocation
process . . . revis[ing] the definition of specialty occupation
to increase focus on truly obtaining the best and brightest
foreign nationals via the H-1B program and . . . revis[ing]
the definition of employment and employer-employee
relationship to help better protect U.S. workers and
wages.387
Combining the executive orders, memoranda, and presidential
statements—on Twitter and the White House website—the current
administration’s attitude is reminiscent of former INS
Commissioner James Ziglar’s “zero tolerance policy” after the 9/11
attacks.388 This policy essentially stemmed from reports that the 9/11
terrorists had all been in the United States on student visas, which
were either irregularly issued or violated some other requirement.389
The zero tolerance policy implied to INS adjudicators that there
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Memorandum from James W. Ziglar, Comm’r, Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., to All Reg’l Dirs. and All Dist. Dirs. (Mar. 22, 2002).
389. In fact, many of the 9/11 terrorists had doctored visas, had gained entry
using tourist visas, or had overstayed their lawful periods of stay. See NAT’L COMM’N
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 222,
235, 237 (2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5G55-8TQX].
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would be no problem if an agent did not approve an
immigration-approvable application or petition, but that there
would be severe consequences if an agent approved an application or
petition that should have been denied.390 This resembles the Trump
administration’s message to the immigration field offices, although
President Trump’s communication has been embroidered with
much more negativity towards immigrants.
The contentious political climate surrounding immigration has
also interfered with Congress’ ability to adopt a fiscal year budget.391
On January 20, 2018, the federal government began its shutdown
procedure when Congress was unable to agree on a continuing
resolution on the budget, largely because of disagreement on
elements of immigration reform.392 The author notes that the
contentious nature of these discussions was provoked, in part, by
President Trump’s own vulgar and insensitive remarks about
immigrants in a widely reported discussion session he hosted with
congressional leadership at the White House on January 11, 2018.393
The debate surrounding immigration—in the context of the
budget negotiations—focused on five areas:
(1) Achieving a conditional permanent residence
immigration status that would lead to citizenship for
DACA recipients who had been in the United States since
certain dates;
(2) Appropriating tens of billions of dollars for a border wall,
related border security technologies, and hiring
personnel;

390. Memorandum from James W. Ziglar, Comm’r, supra note 388 (“Individuals
who fail to abide by issued field guidance or other INS policy will be disciplined
appropriately.”).
391. See Rachael Bade & Burgess Everett, Congress Struggles to Clinch Budget
Deal, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/
29/congress-budget-2018-democrats-republicans-374134 [https://perma.cc/E675Q29H].
392. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, Government Shutdown Begins as
Budget Talks Falter in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/19/us/politics/senate-showdown-government-shutdown-trump.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/4WRN-XU9W].
393. Seung Min Kim & Matthew Nussbaum, White House Doesn’t Deny Trump’s
‘Shithole’ Immigration Remark, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2018, 10:29 PM), https://www.poli
tico.com/story/2018/01/11/trump-shithole-immigration-remark-337070 [https:
//perma.cc/D4KT-PMC6] (reporting that Trump had referred to African nations
as “shithole countries”).
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(3) Eliminating the Diversity Visa program and ending the
Temporary Protected Status of some 400,000 individuals;
(4) Limiting family immigration to spouses and minor
children, providing parents of US citizens some sort of
temporary visiting visa, and prohibiting parents of DACA
recipients from receiving any immigration status except
for a multi-year, immigration status; and
(5) Reducing legal immigration.394
It is this author’s opinion that President Trump’s approach to
enforcement and adjudication will lead to even more delays,
backlogs, expense, and complications as employers, employees, and
immigrants try to adjust to this new reality. Perhaps that is the
intended outcome.395
VIII. CONCLUSION: GOING FORWARD
There is a reason why the number of immigration lawyers in this
country has grown exponentially and is likely to increase.396 It is
likely that whatever new system the United States government
creates—or even how it enforces the current system—will be

394. By virtue of the tactically driven secrecy of the budget negotiations, at the
time of this writing, there is no written source to cite for these negotiation objectives.
Described is a summary of topics taken from various authoritative sources. For an
excellent chart showing the elements of the legislative proposals, see Lisa
Desjardins, Every Immigration Proposal In One Chart, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 12, 2018,
3:42 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/every-immigration-proposal-inone-chart [http://perma.cc/4AKJ-65MM].
395. Unable to arrive at an agreement on these issues, the Senate Democrats
would not vote for a continuing resolution permitting the funding of the federal
government past January 19, 2018, so the federal government went into a brief
shutdown mode beginning January 20, 2018. See Stolberg & Kaplan, supra note 392.
See, e.g., Caroline Mimbs Nyce & Chris Bodenner, Looking Back at Amnesty Under
Reagan, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/
notes/2016/05/thirty-years-after-the-immigration-reform-and-control-act/482364/
[https://perma.cc/KH9Y-YB5E] (chronicling evolving needs for immigration laws
in society); Allena Tapia, 5 Reasons You Should Care About Immigration Reform,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2013, 6:35 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
allena/5-reasons-you-should-care_b_2570633.html
[https://perma.cc/Z837CCG7] (discussing why immigration policies need to adapt with changes with
society before becoming problematic).
396. Delece Smith-Barrow, Pursue a J.D. for an Immigration Law, Policy Career, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 19, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education
/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2016-01-19/pursue-a-jd-for-an-im
migration-law-policy-career [https://perma.cc/2UQJ-FYJC].
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complex. But as complex and frustrating as it is, the contemporary
practice of immigration law provides intellectual challenge and great
personal satisfaction to those fortunate enough to have the
opportunity to practice it.
In many respects, Americans have not progressed far in our
collective perception of immigration. Unfortunately, we still view
immigration as a utilitarian policy, whether geared toward meeting
insufficient labor market demands or threatening jobs of United
States citizens.397 We still experience the “drawbridge effect” of those
who have recently immigrated, feeling threatened by those not yet
here.398 We still incorporate notions of ethnicity in our collective
judgments about the value of immigrants who are not from Western
Europe or who are not Anglo-Christian.399 We have substituted a
Muslim ban for a Chinese or Japanese ban. We view immigrants as
unfairly drawing from public benefits.400 We too often base our
opinions on speculation, fear, or assumptions, rather than on facts.
We have difficulty believing that people who come from different
cultures, with differing religions or languages, are capable of
adapting to the Constitution of our Founding Fathers. We live in a
very difficult environment—one in which it is hard for people to
agree on where to find accurate facts, let alone agree on them. But
choosing one’s facts serves too many agendas. Overcoming these
difficulties would be to our collective benefit.
We should, however, be able to agree on some things. First, it is
possible to identify categories of people to whom we should grant
access to the United States. Whether these people are relatives,
workers, or some other group is a fair subject for debate. Second,
with the advancement of technology, we should be able to create an
397. For an example of an excellent analysis of immigration and the state
workforce, see generally RYAN ALLEN, IMMIGRANTS AND MINNESOTA’S WORKFORCE
(2017).
398. BRIMELOW, supra note 174.
399. Id.
400. For examples of the public benefits issue, see Julianne Hing, The Truth
About Immigrants and Public Benefits, THE NATION (June 29, 2017), https://www.the
nation.com/article/the-truth-about-immigrants-and-public-benefits/ [https://per
ma.cc/QD57-CPAN]; Tara Watson, Do Undocumented Immigrants Overuse Government
Benefits?, ECONOFACT (Mar. 28, 2017), http://econofact.org/do-undocumentedimmigrants-overuse-government-benefits [https://perma.cc/UQ4H-FD5V]; Laura
Reston, Immigrants Don’t Drain Welfare. They Fund It, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122714/immigrants-dont-drain-welfare-they-fun
d-it [https://perma.cc/JJQ3-JKR2].
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immigration system that accurately accounts for who is here and who
leaves. Third, we should be able to create a system that provides
people, within a reasonable time, a decision on whether they get to
live here or not. In order to form a more perfect union, we must
decide whether to accept, embrace, and manage immigration, or
whether to significantly restrict and limit immigration and
generate our population and workforce from within our existing
populace—and be willing to live, as we must, with the consequences.
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